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Preface 
This report is a result of the 32d seminar of the European Association of 
Agricultural Economists (EAAE), which was held in Wageningen, March 
22—23, 1993. The seminar was organized by Wageningen Agricultural 
University (P.C. van den Noort, J.A. Renkema, W.J.M. Heijman and H.J. 
Silvis), in co-operation with the Agricultural Economics Research Institute LEI 
(L.C. Zachariasse and K.J. Poppe), the Dutch ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
Conservation and Fisheries (H.R. Toxopeus) and Rabobank Nederland (A.M. 
Dierick). 
The seminar attracted more than a hundred participants from all over 
Europe. The theme of the seminar was the situation and perspectives (policies 
included) concerning capital and finance in Western and Eastern European 
agriculture. In his opening speech Rector H.C. van der Plas noted that 
Wageningen Agricultural University was celebrating its 75th anniversary. He 
stressed the importance of the seminar's theme for society and the university, 
saying that 'in fact, all our basic and agricultural knowledge would be useless 
without capital'. 
The scientific programme of the seminar consisted of four parts: 
— General Aspects of Capital and Finance in Agriculture; 
— Capital Needs and Investment Priorities; 
— Methods of Financing in Agriculture; and, 
— International Institutions and Co-operation. 
All four parts had one or more invited lectures, whereas part II and part III 
also contained the six contributed paper sessions (of three papers each). This 
report contains a selected number of papers, which cover the main parts of the 
seminar. The contributed papers, which have been distributed earlier, are 
available on request. The titles and authors of the papers of the seminar are 
given in annex I. 
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Introduction 
H.J. Silvis 
This report contains six papers of the 32d EAAE seminar 'Capital and Finance 
in Western and Eastern European Agriculture', which was held in Wageningen 
from March 22-23, 1993. Details of the programme of the seminar with the 
contributed and invited papers are given in an appendix of this report. The 
purpose of this introduction is to give an overview of the selected papers. 
The first paper is by the Chairman of the Executive Board of Rabobank 
Nederland, H.H.F. Wijffels. He presents a broad and practical analysis of the 
problems of capital and finance in European agriculture. Attention is focused 
on the external factors (agricultural policy, trade policy, legislation) and 
internal factors (solvency, liquidity, profitability, entrepreneurship) of general 
importance in financing the agricultural sector. Each of these factors is treated 
with respect to developments in Eastern and Western Europe. Finally, the 
contributions which the governments in Eastern and Western Europe can make 
to improve the situation for the Eastern European agricultural sector are 
examined. Wijffels concludes that the position of agriculture in Eastern Europe 
is rather poor. Credit granting will scarcely be able to get off the ground 
without assistance. The EC can make a contribution by opening its market for 
Eastern European agricultural products. In Eastern Europe itself the establish-
ment of a good leasing system can limit the need for capital, whereas a co-
operative banking system could provide an important stimulus for the creation 
of a good financing structure. 
The second and by far the longest paper is by K.J. Poppe (LEI-DLO, 
The Hague), who gives a well documented, comparative perspective on 
financing in Western European agriculture. His paper starts with some 
observations concerning basic financial accounting in relation to the profit and 
loss account, the balance sheet and the statement of the flow of funds (or cash 
flow statement). Next, the current situation in the EC and some currently 
controversial issues are discussed. Data from the EC's Farm Accountancy 
Data Network (FADN) are used to describe the current financial situation in 
the EC. Then the paper deals with investments in land and with the various 
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methods used to finance the use of land. In both Eastern and Western Europe 
the relationship between profitability and land values is considered to be a 
central issue. One issue further is the transfer of the land and farm to the next 
generation. The increased use of capital in agriculture makes farm succession 
more difficult. A section of the paper is devoted to that topic. Having dis-
cussed how farmers acquire debt, the paper turns to the topic of farmers in 
financial difficulties, and investments by farmers in agricultural co-operatives. 
After having treated the role of agricultural policy, the paper ends with some 
recommendations for the research community for further action. Poppe argues 
that agricultural economists should look more closely at the indicators used in 
financial accounting. This should help to more fully understand the observed 
differences between regions and farm types throughout Europe. Some co-
operation with colleagues in (tax-) law and sociology could be beneficial in 
this type of research. Tool box and theory could be applied more often in 
policy analysis and in the advisory role. For policy analysis the relationship 
between the farm and the sector level needs more attention. As capital 
becomes even more important, according to Poppe, the academic world should 
study finance in more detail and in closer contact with non-agricultural 
colleagues. 
Professor P.C. van de Noort (Wageningen Agricultural University) 
contributes the third paper, which deals specifically with tenancy. It is stated 
that tenancy has at least four important functions: able farmers can be helped 
to farm, even when they have inadequate capital for a family farm or a 
commercial enterprise; tenancy increases the stability of the land market; the 
tenancy system attracts capital for land improvement, buildings, and even for 
new land; and a good farm structure is more likely under tenancy, because 
there are fewer reasons for splitting up holdings than for splitting up owner-
operated farms. Focusing on the tenancy system in the Netherlands, Van den 
Noort shows that tenants are not the submissive, poor farmers of former days. 
On the contrary, many of them can even afford to buy farms and they have a 
strong social, legal and political position. Old sentiments have misled policy 
makers, resulting in policies that are now leading to the decline of the system. 
Unless policies change in the Netherlands, the tenancy system will continue to 
decline until it reaches a level comparable with that in the rest of Europe, 
where a large majority (80%) of farmers own their farms. 
In the fourth paper Professor C. Csâki (World Bank and University of 
Budapest) focuses on investment priorities in Central and Eastern European 
agriculture. The paper starts with the observation that Central-Eastern Europe 
and the former USSR are undergoing a fundamental economic and political 
transformation. This process has not yet been completed in any of the coun-
tries concerned: many details have yet to be clarified, especially in the former 
USSR, and there is much uncertainty regarding future developments. All these 
changes, however, will fundamentally reshape the agricultural economy in the 
region and set new demands for capital and priorities in investment. After 
having described and analyzed the current situation in agriculture in Central-
Eastern Europe and in the former USSR, the paper turns to the transformation 
of agriculture. Investment needs are rather closely related to the results of the 
ongoing transition process in agriculture. The main direction of the transform-
ation of the region's economies is shaped by the legacy of the command 
economy. In each country, the objective is to develop an economic agricultural 
structure based on a market economy, which leads to private initiatives and an 
economy based on private ownership. Major areas of investment are: the 
development of the physical facilities for a working market for agricultural 
products and inputs for agriculture; rehabilitation of production facilities to 
reach a minimum level of food security in most of the FSU countries; 
recapitalization of agriculture according to the emerging new farming struc-
ture; reconstruction and major modernization of support services (such as the 
seed industry and machinery maintenance); reconstruction and major modern-
ization of agro-processing; introduction of environmentally friendly technol-
ogies. Csâki concludes that there are a lot of problems, but that there is no 
reason for despair. He feels that it is best to be realistic at the outset. The 
early euphoria envisioned a quick transformation, followed by an equally 
quick supply response. But developments thus far, and the experience of both 
Eastern Europe and East Germany, suggest otherwise. Gradually, the percep-
tion is growing that the process will be slower than anticipated and that, 
consequently, the social and political strains on these very fragile systems will 
be greater. However, one also has to believe that the whole task is not 
impossible. The region has all the natural, economic and human resources 
necessary to become a fully integrated and prosperous part of the developed 
world with developed and productive agriculture in the foreseeable future. 
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In the fifth paper M. Franco (Commission of the EC) gives an interest-
ing overview of what the European Community is doing for the Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) at the moment, not only the PHARE 
programme but also other initiatives and activities. First, he deals with the 
general accomplishments in Central and Eastern Europe. Next, attention is 
focused on the relationship between the European Community and Central and 
Eastern Europe. To what extent has the European Community provided the 
necessary support for the transformation process? The political and the 
commercial efforts are described, and further the financial and technical areas 
of co-operation. In the field of technical and financial co-operation three types 
of problems are treated: stabilization, transformation, and development. 
Finally the paper turns to the role of PHARE and TACIS (a program for the 
former Soviet Union) in the transformation of agriculture. For PHARE the 
percentage of the total amount spent on agriculture in CEE is around 12% or 
300 million ECU. For TACIS this is also between 10 and 15% or approxi-
mately 120 million ECU over 1991 and 1992. This money has been spent on 
supply programmes, technical assistance, and financial assistance. The paper 
gives a number of practical problems encountered with the implementation of 
the programme. 
The sixth and final paper is by M. Tracy (Agricultural Policy Studies), 
who picks up some of the points that have been made in the invited and 
contributed papers of the seminar, and adds a few points of his own. Attention 
is directed at Eastern Europe, though also something is said about the role of 
the West. Some fundamental topics for the CEECs with respect to agriculture 
in the market economy are dealt with, such as pre-conditions for the establish-
ment of a market economy, institutions relevant to the financing of agricul-
ture, and the role of incentives and subsidies. With respect to institutions 
relevant to the financing of agriculture, Tracy stresses that we must be very 
careful about giving advice based on Western experience to our colleagues in 
the CEECs. Institutions that have evolved in a given social and economic 
context cannot necessarily be transposed into a different context. At the most, 
we can say: here we have an institution which has worked quite well for us -
maybe you will find it useful too. But it is for those responsible in the CEECs 
themselves to decide what can work in their circumstances, according to 
Tracy. 
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Chapter 1 
Problems of Capital and Finance in European Agriculture: 
An Outlook 
H.H.F. Wijffels1 
1.1 Introduction 
We are living in a period in which the agricultural sector is experiencing 
difficulties. The changes taking place in the former communist states in Central 
and Eastern Europe are even absolutely revolutionary. Since the Iron Curtain 
disappeared in 1989 the economies of these countries have rapidly declined. In 
addition, every sector, including agriculture, is confronted with the transition 
from a planned to a market economy and must deal with the problems and 
uncertainties which accompany such a transformation. 
But it is not only in Eastern Europe that agriculture is confronted with 
changes. In the EC, too, the agricultural sector is having to cope with a marked 
change in policy. The transition from a market and price policy to an income 
supplement policy can be regarded as fundamental. As a result of this, 
agricultural prices will move increasingly towards the world market level in the 
coming years. In the future, therefore, farmers in the EC will be guided by 
developments on the world market to a greater extent than before. 
The transformation in Eastern European agriculture will have to be 
accompanied by the establishment of a good financing system. At present, acute 
financing problems are emerging in Eastern Europe due to widespread 
disinvestments. One result is that capital - already a scarce commodity - is being 
withdrawn from agriculture. People are using up their assets in order to keep 
their businesses going. The changes in Western Europe will also be accompanied 
by changes in the method of financing. 
In my paper, I would first like to focus attention on the factors of general 
importance in financing the agricultural sector. Next, I shall deal with each of 
these factors individually and give an outline of the developments in Eastern and 
Western Europe. Finally, I will examine the contributions which the governments 
Chairman of the Executive Board of Rabobank Nederland. 
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in Eastern Europe itself, but also in Western Europe can make, to improve the 
situation for the Eastern European agricultural sector. 
1.2 Financing problems 
In the agricultural sector there is a need for borrowed capital which, in Western 
Europe, is frequently supplied by banks and family members. In the near future, 
incidentally, this financing may come under pressure as a result of the reforms 
of the Common Agricultural Policy. The farmers will be confronted with lower 
prices for their intervention commodities, in which case they will admittedly 
receive direct income support by way of compensation. Every agricultural 
entrepreneur will have to take advantage of the new developments in order to 
offset downward pressures on profitability. 
In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, farmers are confronted with very 
sharp price drops without receiving any counterbalancing income support. To 
keep the business going in spite of this, they sell more and more of their 
production resources as time goes by. These disinvestments point to a great and 
acute need for external finance. If this need were to be met, positive change 
could be achieved in Eastern European agriculture. 
The willingness to supply finance, however, depends on both external 
factors and internal factors. External factors relate to aspects over which the 
entrepreneur has no control, such as developments in agricultural policy, national 
trade policy, legislation on agriculture and the situation in the banking world. 
Internal factors are the aspects which vary from one business to another: 
solvency, liquidity, profitability, entrepreneurship and the collateral a business 
can provide. 
1.3 External factors 
First of all, I will discuss the developments of the external factors in Western and 
Eastern European countries. Up to now the common agricultural policy of the 
EC has been based on high guaranteed prices for particular products and 
protection from agricultural products originating outside the EC. Generally 
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speaking, the farmer did well under this system, and this policy therefore had a 
positive effect on the willingness of loan capital suppliers to provide finance. In 
spite of the latest reforms, quite a few income certainties of this type will 
continue to exist, such as the hectare supplements. There will therefore be 
scarcely any pressure on creditors' willingness to supply finance. Eastern 
European agricultural policy is hardly concerned with providing income 
guarantees, while farmers in these countries were accustomed to receiving high 
guaranteed prices under the communist system. Nowadays, however, they have 
to produce for the world market or even for prices below world market level. 
This situation causes problems in the sector, resulting in a decreased willingness 
on the part of banks and other bodies to grant credit. 
Another external factor is trade policy. To a certain extent it is closely 
connected with the agricultural policy pursued. In the EC, the sale of many 
agricultural products is guaranteed. If an entrepreneur cannot find a customer 
himself, he can offer his products for intervention. The intervention agencies can 
either store these products or sell them on the world market with the help of 
subsidies. Conversely, EC's frontiers are practically closed for a number of 
agricultural products which want to enter the Community from outside. This 
protection also exists on the frontiers of Eastern Europe. These countries are 
therefore also confronted with limited competition from countries abroad. 
Intervention prices however, scarcely exist. Sales problems resulting from this 
have a negative effect on the extent of credit granting. 
A third external factor is legislation. The legislation relating to agriculture 
in the EC has mainly been dominated by environmental legislation in recent 
years. Increasingly strict requirements are imposed on the use of crop protectants, 
artificial fertilizers, the production of manure related to ammonia emissions, and 
so on. The manure problem is highly controversial, particularly here in the 
Netherlands, where we have a very intensive cattle farming sector. Frequent 
investments must be made in order to meet legal requirements. These investments 
bring little or no improvements in earnings. As a result, the profitability of a 
business can decline and thus limit the possibilities for financing. In Eastern 
Europe the environmental problem plays a much more limited role, at least in 
agriculture. What is important in the former East Bloc, however, is the 
legislation on landownership. Since a great deal of land was taken into use by the 
large agricultural co-operatives in the years following the Second World War, 
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there are now large areas which can be reclaimed by the original owners or their 
descendants. This is organized differently in each country, but generally 
speaking, the possibility exists, for land and buildings in agricultural enterprises, 
to be claimed back by the original owners. As long as there is still no certainty 
about the extent of the claims on the agricultural enterprises, no definitive 
business plan can, in fact, be drawn up. This can be an important barrier in a 
credit application. 
I now come to the last external factor: the health of the local banking 
system. Generally speaking, this can be described as good in Western Europe, 
particularly when it is compared to the situation in Eastern Europe. When the 
other external factors are assessed as positive by the banks, credit in the Western 
agricultural sector will generally be granted at reasonable rates as a result of the 
competition between the banks. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the 
position of the banks is extremely weak. This weak position is due in part to bad 
debts, which originated before the transformation, but which still appear on the 
balance sheet. The limited funds available to the banks are invested in the 
strongest sectors as far as possible. Unfortunately, agriculture is not one of them. 
An additional problem is the fact that despite the establishment of some foreign 
banks in the various Eastern European countries, competition between banks is 
still limited. The scant competition which does exist has little or no influence on 
the primary agricultural sector, which explains why the limited possibilities for 
credit in general become particularly evident in agriculture. For even if the banks 
are prepared to grant credits to the agricultural sector, they will always charge 
very high rates because of the lack of competition. This makes it even more 
difficult for agricultural companies to meet debt service requirements. With the 
negative development of the other external factors, and limited possibilities for 
the banking industry itself, credit granting to the agricultural sector does not get 
off the ground. As it is thus difficult to make improvements in agriculture, this 
sector seems to be caught in a vicious circle. 
1.4 Internal factors 
Internal factors become important when external factors have developed in such 
a way that they no longer constitute an obstacle to credit granting. Banks must 
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take a positive attitude to granting credit to the agricultural sector, and they must 
also be in a position not to charge absurdly high rates for this. Despite the 
presence of some negative aspects in the external factors, this is clearly the case 
in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe the situation is much more difficult. 
Consequently, the requirements to be met by the internal factors will probably 
be higher there than in Western Europe. Only highly promising companies 
qualify for credit. 
Western Europe 
Solvency can be defined as the ratio between equity capital and the balance sheet 
total. In a large part of the agricultural sector in the EC this amounts to well over 
90%. This can mean two things. On the one hand, it can indicate that the 
businesses are so sound that external financing is scarcely necessary. On the other 
hand, it can point to very moderate prospects, so that it is hardly possible to find 
financial institutions or persons who are willing to provide loans to the company. 
The latter is probably closest to the truth, since solvency is lowest in those 
countries where agricultural productivity is best. One exception may be Denmark, 
where solvency is extremely low and productivity is high. In general it may be 
said that even in the EC, with its Common Agricultural Policy and its sound 
banking industry, many farmers are mainly dependent on their own capital 
equity. 
Liquidity is almost by definition a greater problem in arable farming than 
in cattle farming. The cyclical nature of sowing and harvesting provides the 
farmer with an irregular cash flow. Liquidity is also linked to profitability, the 
third internal factor. Profitability is one of the most important items that play a 
part in credit granting. Before credits are granted, there have to be good 
prospects of profit in order to be able to repay the interest and capital. 
Under the influence of the reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, 
profitability in Western Europe is under pressure to some extent. The prices of 
cereals and beef will fall sharply in the coming years, while production costs will 
probably rise. This is partly offset by some income support from the government, 
however. 
The fourth internal factor, entrepreneurship, is a very important matter for 
the credit granter. Good plans and knowledge can be of decisive importance for 
the bank in making the ultimate decision. Entrepreneurs in Western Europe are 
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in general very familiar with the situation in the agricultural sector and can take 
excellent advantage of it as a result. This can be credited to the reasonably stable 
situation in Western European agricultural policy. 
Finally, in the field of collateral, farmers in the EC may be confronted 
with a drop in land prices as a consequence of the decline in selling prices. But 
the land, which meanwhile acts as collateral for the bank, has frequently been 
assessed at a fairly low value, so this decline in prices does not have to be an 
obstacle to the granting of further credits. 
Eastern Europe 
Internal factors in Eastern Europe are being affected by changes in agriculture to 
a much greater extent than those in Western Europe. Solvency naturally plays an 
important role in financing in this region as well. As it happens, however, 
solvency in Eastern Europe in general — and hence also in agriculture — is 
difficult to determine. This is connected with the transitional phase in which these 
economies at present find themselves. For them, balance sheet management is a 
new phenomenon. Even the concepts of profit and loss are completely new to 
many enterprises. 
In drawing up a balance sheet, assets and debts should be expressed in 
terms of value. To do this, it is first necessary to determine what production 
resources a business owns, and then to establish the value of these production 
resources. Granting rights of ownership of the production resources in the former 
East Bloc countries is a politically charged and therefore time-consuming task. 
Next, determining the value of these production resources is a problem, for there 
has scarcely been any trading based on free market principles. And where there 
is no market, no market prices are established; where there are no market prices, 
no valuation can take place. 
Organizational structure can also influence solvency. Since agricultural 
enterprises frequently still have to opt for their structure, it is important to 
recognize the consequences of a specific organizational structure on the capital 
position of a company and hence its solvency. In this respect one can think of 
different organizational structures. 
First, there is the co-operative, based on the communistic principle, or 
following the Western style. The Western style co-operative is completely 
different from those which, until recently, were familiar in communist countries. 
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In the West, co-operatives are organizations whose members actually have a say, 
which operate within the market and, in addition, function in line with market 
principles. The ties between the limited membership of such a co-operative and 
the business itself — just as in a family business — can be very strong; the 
members will often be prepared to commit themselves to it entirely. A co-
operative structure can achieve an improved solvency position because each 
member can contribute capital. As a result, the volume of equity capital increases 
and the dependence on borrowed capital becomes limited. A negative aspect of 
the co-operative structure, however, is the danger of a member leaving the 
business and taking his capital with him, which may have a negative effect on 
solvency and hence on the continuity of the company. 
The second conceivable legal form in agriculture is the private limited 
liability company. In such a company the dependence on borrowed capital, just 
as in the co-operative, can remain limited because the shareholders contribute 
capital. An advantage of the private limited liability company compared with the 
co-operative is that there is no possibility of leaving the company with the 
invested capital. Of course, members can always try to sell their shares, but this 
implies by definition, that there will have to be a buyer. On the other hand, the 
involvement of the employees in a private limited liability company will probably 
decline more rapidly in the long term than it will in a cooperative. This has to 
do with the mutual solidarity on which a co-operative is based and the financial 
accountability which exists for the members of a co-operative. 
The third form is the family farm, well-known to us in Western Europe. 
As regards the involvement in the company this is an ideal business structure, but 
solvency is much more difficult to achieve. 
A last possible organizational structure is a different type of family farm, 
one which seeks intensive co-operation with other family farms. The need for 
borrowed capital can also remain limited here because it is possible, for example, 
to manage a range of machines together with several businesses, while continuing 
to operate entirely independently. A structure such as this has already been 
frequently employed successfully in the Netherlands. 
The optimum business structure is partly determined by the farm's 
specialization. For example, the intensive attention required in dairy farming 
means that this form of business will probably function optimally as a family 
farm. On the other hand, intensive cattle farming — a branch of agriculture 
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which can be run along almost industrial lines — is more suitable for the private 
limited liability company or cooperative. Successful examples can already be 
found in the USA. In the case of arable farming, cooperation between family 
businesses is probably the easiest solution as regards machinery. On the one 
hand, this limits the need for borrowed capital and, on the other hand, flexible 
use can be made of the available labour for the very irregular division of tasks. 
The other internal factors are also problematic in Eastern Europe. As 
already described, the lack of liquid assets — which arises because there are no 
forms of income support — is solved by disinvestments. This is obviously not a 
long-term solution. It will be very important to improve this situation very soon. 
However, profitability has deteriorated seriously in recent years. It is difficult to 
determine entrepreneurship in the former East Bloc. Businessmen are confronted 
with many uncertainties, which makes it difficult to adjust optimally to the 
circumstances or to make plans for the future. Nevertheless, one can assume that 
good businessmen can be found in this part of Europe too, so that this is not by 
definition a negative aspect as regards credit granting. Providing the bank with 
collateral is a new phenomenon in Eastern Europe. Since there has been scarcely 
any trading in production resources as yet, it is very difficult to determine to 
what extent these production resources can act as collateral. Generally speaking, 
this will result in a low valuation. As a result, the value of the production 
resources which act as collateral will remain relatively limited. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it may be stated that the possibilities for 
agricultural financing in Eastern Europe are very much poorer than in the EC and 
will therefore remain very limited for the time being. This brings us to the 
question of what actions could be taken to bring about an improvement in this 
situation. 
1.5 Government policy 
National governments in Eastern Europe — in the same way as the EC — could 
give a helping hand. Financing in agriculture can be improved, for example, by 
providing income support, although this will probably be impossible because of 
lack of funds; by providing temporary interest rate subsidies to agriculture; by 
setting up good leasing legislation and by establishing a co-operative credit 
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institute. 
Interest rate subsidies 
Interest rates in Eastern European agriculture will be very high because of a lack 
of competition between banks. In addition, farmers in these countries are 
confronted with very unfavourable price developments and a clear deterioration 
in the terms of trade. The specific price increases in agricultural products are 
lagging behind the price increases in general. The consequence of this is the 
higher-than-average real interest rate for the agricultural sector. If the govern-
ment proceeds to grant interest rate subsidies on a sectoral basis, this can mean 
that entrepreneurs in each sector will be confronted with corresponding real 
interest rate percentages. In Poland, a budget already exists for interest rate 
subsidies for investments in agriculture. When such subsidies are granted, the 
entrepreneur can borrow money more cheaply. The basis interest rate in the 
agricultural sector is already about 15% lower than the market rate, and 
additional discounts of between 30 and 50% are given on this. Such interventions 
are at odds with present market developments, but in the difficult transitional 
period they might create some temporary relief. 
Leasing 
Since financing by banks will continue to be limited for the time being — if only 
because the banks' funds are restricted — it is necessary to look for other 
financing instruments. Land is a means of production which, in principle, is very 
suitable for obtaining finance outside the bank. Financing the purchase of land 
by the farmer himself, or financing by means of bank credits, is even inadvisa-
ble. The point is that if a farmer buys land with his own capital from a person 
who is leaving the agricultural sector, then that capital, which is already scarce 
in the sector, and which is freely available in this case, disappears to other 
sectors. Financing by means of leasing is therefore a better alternative. A tenant 
farmer is in the comfortable position of not requiring any capital in order to buy 
land, but only needs working capital to be able to produce on this land. Leasing 
therefore does not make any claims on the solvency of an enterprise and is thus 
very important in the transformation taking place within the agricultural sector. 
As regards the annual charges, the differences need not necessarily be great, but 
that depends on the ratio between the interest rate and repayment, on the one 
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hand, and the rent, on the other hand. At present, this probably works out to the 
clear advantage of leasing as a result of the unfavourable interest rate structure 
in agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe. The government can promote 
leasing as a form of financing by establishing good leasing legislation and 
creating stimulatory measures. In this respect, one can think of stimulatory tax 
measures consisting partly of a higher tax levy for the landowner if agricultural 
land is not in production, and partly of a certain tax exemption on the rental (e.g. 
2 ha free). A differentiation in policy according to landowner is probably 
important in this respect. 
In the case of land owned by individuals, the legislation should emphasize 
the balance between the interests of the tenant and the landlord. For the landlord, 
it must continue to be possible to recover the right to use his own land, while for 
the tenant there must be some degree of certainty. It is important that uncertainty 
concerning the period for which the land will be available to him, is reduced as 
much as possible. In the case of companies and other land-owning bodies the 
leasing system can be aimed more at the interests of the lessee, since such 
organizations are frequently willing to give up their land for a longer period of 
time. This gives the lessee more certainty as regards the duration of use. State-
owned land is ideal for initiating a complete structural improvement in the 
agricultural sector. Business relocation and expansion can be achieved by land 
redistribution and re-allotment. Extra opportunities can be created for promising 
companies by granting them the right to use state-owned acreage. If the good 
entrepreneurs make use of such opportunities, structural improvements also 
become possible at the locations which become vacant. Up to now, I have mainly 
emphasized the advantages for the lessee, but there are also clear advantages for 
the landlord: he receives an annual rent instead of only a low, once-only return 
when he sells. The value of land can rise when market conditions improve. A 
drop in value at the present price level is virtually impossible. His land is 
normally well maintained by the lessee, particularly if a long-term contract is 
involved. And finally, in the case of a long-term leasing contract it is profitable 
for the lessee to invest in the land, which is advantageous to both the lessee and 
the lessor. 
Let me repeat here that it is important to realize that leasing legislation can 
also disturb the land market. It must continue to be possible for the land owner 
to act flexibly. It must not be the case that if a land owner proceeds to lease his 
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acreage he will run the risk of never being able to have his land freely available 
again. The fact is that the interests of the lessee and the lessor can also become 
opposed to each other. A balance can be found, for example, by means of 
variable-term leasing contracts with a minimum duration and possibly also with 
the right to extension. In that way one can avoid a situation arising in the long-
term such as exists to a certain extent in the Netherlands: landowners are scarcely 
prepared to lease their land any longer, for as a result of the existing leasing 
legislation it is hardly possible for them to regain free control of this land within 
a period of 6 to 12 years. This has led to a relative decline in the amount of 
acreage leased. 
Co-operative banking 
To enable financial resources to be obtained on reasonable terms in spite of the 
so far limited credit possibilities in Eastern Europe, a co-operative financial 
institution could probably offer a solution. At the time of the agricultural crisis 
in the nineteenth century it was Wilhelm Raiffeisen who saw that the agricultural 
sector in Germany was suffering too greatly under the yoke of the credit granting 
organizations of those days. The mutual solidarity which existed among the 
agricultural population led to the possibility of raising and investing money within 
this community on reasonable terms. Solidarity within the agricultural population 
in Eastern Europe may now perhaps exist, but the volume of savings required by 
the banks is probably inadequate. It is therefore important to tap another source 
of funds. The EC could possibly play an important role in this area. Technical 
and financial support in setting up a credit system for the agricultural sector can 
lead to positive development within this sector. It is the EC itself that can benefit 
by this. It is important to realize that agriculture — the primary sector in Eastern 
Europe, in which some 15% of the working population are engaged — will have 
to develop positively in order to stimulate the economy as a whole. Failure to 
achieve economic growth might result in internal conflicts or lead to a flood of 
economic refugees heading for the West. The situation in Eastern Europe can be 
compared to some extent with the position of Germany after the Second World 
War. At that time it was the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau — which was able 
to grant credits thanks to American support — that enabled the German economy 
to develop positively at an accelerated rate and rapidly close the gap between 
Germany and the countries around it. 
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The credit granting which would become possible with a comparable 
instrument for agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe would have to take 
place on reasonable terms; borrowers in the agricultural sector would be charged 
an affordable, possibly even a temporarily negative, real interest rate. The 
additional advantage of a credit institution concerned especially with agriculture 
is the expertise which can be built up as a result. Agriculture is a special sector 
with sharp fluctuations in its results. The credit granter must certainly have some 
feeling for this. If that exists it is possible to make a much more realistic estimate 
of the risks involved in granting credit. An improvement in risk assessment will 
probably also lead to an improvement in the credit conditions. 
In my view, it is preferable for such an institution to have a co-operative 
structure. The area in which a co-operative financial institution aimed at the 
agricultural sector operates will have to be confined to the local community so 
that it can check on the projects it has financed. In this way a banking network 
can be created. Moreover, a co-operative credit system may be expected to grant 
credit at lower rates than other financial intermediaries because maximizing profit 
is not its primary aim. This is very important in a sector where margins are 
limited. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Summing up, I would say that the position of agriculture in Eastern Europe is 
rather poor. Credit granting will scarcely be able to get off the ground without 
assistance. The EC can make a contribution by creating more opportunities for 
the sale of Eastern European agricultural products on the Western European 
market. The reforms of the European agricultural policy already initiated, with 
the changeover from a market and price policy to a system of direct income 
support, can be regarded as a first contribution. But a further expansion of the 
agricultural paragraph of the treaty of association between the EC and various 
Eastern European countries and the successful conclusion of the GATT 
negotiations are also essential. In Eastern Europe itself the establishment of a 
good leasing system can limit the need for capital. Finally, a co-operative 
banking system can provide an important stimulus for the ultimate creation of a 
good financing institute. 
Chapter 2 
Financing in Western European Agriculture: 
A Comparative Perspective 
K.J. Poppe1 
2.1 Introduction 
The Agricultural University of Wageningen should not only be congratulated 
with its 75th anniversary, but also with the choice of the theme for this 
scientific celebration: the role of capital and finance in agriculture normally 
receives very little attention. To quote Boehlje (1992): 'The traditional 
approach to the financial / organizational structure of most farms and 
agribusiness firms is very myopic. The historical focus in financing has been 
primarily on internally generated equity with debt used if internal sources of 
equity are not adequate to finance the growth of the business. The dominant 
organizational structure has been the sole proprietorship with limited forward 
or backward linkages.' As a result, the textbooks used at this and other 
universities (e.g., Boehlje and Eidman, 1984; Warren, 1982) devote much 
more space to concepts on farm planning and management than to finance. 
Investment analysis and capital budgeting procedures seem more popular than 
the core finance topics like leverage, the sources of funds, and the influence of 
risk, taxes or business organization (including contracts) on finance. Agricul-
tural policy making is another example of the neglected role of capital. 
Policies, including the need for them, are often discussed in terms of their 
effect on income, not on assets or wealth. 
Confronted with this ignorance, this paper starts with some basic 
financial accounting. It is shown further that academic terminology is not 
always consistent and on some points out of date. Next, the current situation 
in the EC and some currently controversial issues are discussed. Data from the 
EC's F ADN (CEG, 1989) are used to describe the current financial situation 
The author works as a business economist with the Agricultural Economic Research 
Institute LEI-DLO in The Hague; he represents the institute in the management committee 
of the EC's Farm Accountancy Data Network. He is indebted to J. Luijt, M. Mulder and 
A.J. Reinhard for their comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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in the EC and to illustrate some topics. Investments in land and the various 
methods used to finance the use of land are topics of much interest in Eastern 
and Western Europe. In both regions the relationship between profitability and 
land values is a central issue. One step further is the transfer of the land and 
farm to the next generation. The increased use of capital in agriculture makes 
farm succession more difficult. A section of this paper is devoted to that topic. 
Having discussed how farmers acquire debt, the paper will turn to the topic of 
farmers in financial difficulties, and investments by farmers in agricultural co-
operatives. From there it is a small step to the role of agricultural policy. The 
paper ends with some recommendations for the research community for 
further action. 
2.2 Financial accounting 
In farm accounting three statements describe the financial situation of the 
farm: the profit and loss account, the balance sheet and the statement of the 
flow of funds (or cash flow statement). As an indicator of the financial health 
of European farming the current statements contain several problems. First 
they are often restricted to the farm as a business, ignoring the fact that most 
farms are family farms. As the farm family allocates resources not only to the 
farm but to other activities as well (Schmitt, 1989; Hill, 1991) such a split is 
arbitrary and difficult to make. Non-farm income, for instance, will clearly 
influence the possibilities to borrow. 
Secondly, the indicators used are sometimes of poor quality or are ill-
defined. A few examples: in the profit and loss account or income statement 
(scheme 1), the key indicator Family Farm Income (FFI) measures the income 
of the farm family (or families if two entrepreneurs share one farm), but this 
is a poor indicator for the efficiency of the farm (Hill, 1991; Poppe, 1992). In 
some member states like Denmark, England and the Low Countries additional 
indicators (net farm result, management and investment income) have been 
introduced to overcome this problem. In those cases imputed costs (opportuni-
ty costs or remuneration claims) for labour and capital are deducted from the 
FFI to calculate the needed efficiency indicators. 
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ECU 
Crop output 20187 
Animal output 20468 
Other output 1459 
Total output 42114 
Specific costs 13995 
Overhead 6512 
Intermediate consumption -/- 20507 
Current grants and taxes + 664 
Gross farm income 22270 
Depreciation 5052 
Farm net value added 17218 
Investment subsidies and grants + 206 
External factors -/- 5002 
Family Farm Income 12422 
Scheme 1 : Profit and loss account, illustrated with data of the average EC farm as 
represented in EC's FADN, 1989/90 
Family farm income 
Income from non-farm assets 
Income from non-farm labour 
Income from social security 
Other non-farm income 
Total non-farm income 
+ • 
Total family income 
Taxes paid (incl. social security) -/-
Disposable income 
Paid wages to family members 
Other family consumption 
Total family consumption 
- / - • 
Current savings 
Scheme 2: Income statement, format used in the Dutch FADN 
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ASSETS ECU 
Land and permanent crops 
Buildings 
Machinery 
Breeding livestock 
+ 
Total fixed assets 127,417 
Other livestock 
Stock of ag. products 
Other circulating capital 
+ 
Total current assets 25,923 
Total assets 153,340 
LIABILITIES 
Net worth 130,784 
Long and medium term loans 
Short term loans 
+ 
Total current liabilities 22,556 
Total liabilities 153,340 
Scheme 3: Balance sheet, illustrated with data of the average EC farm as represented in 
EC's FADN, 1989/90 
As personal taxes and family expenses have to be paid from the FFI, it also 
does not illustrate the debt-servicing capacity of the farm. For that purpose an 
extra income statement could be introduced. Scheme 2 shows the format 
currently used in the Dutch FADN. 
The balance sheet (scheme 3) has its own problems. The introduction of 
tradeable quota, like the milk-quota, seems to have been overlooked by the 
EC's FADN. It is unclear if all quota, or only the quota that have been 
bought, should be entered on the balance sheet. In addition, the depreciation 
of these intangible assets is in discussion. Where the United Kingdom's FADN 
takes the view that quota values will not decrease, others write the historic 
costs down over different periods (e.g., the Netherlands 15 years, Germany 10 
years). Another issue regarding the balance sheet is the treatment of deferred 
payments on product sales by co-operatives. Some co-operatives now oblige 
their members to leave a part of the remuneration for their deliveries in the 
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co-operative for very long periods (10 to 15 years or even for the lifetime of 
the membership), sometimes with an interest below the market rate. A third 
issue is the classification of animals on the balance sheet. Not everyone takes 
the correct view of the EC's F ADN that only breeding livestock should be 
treated as fixed assets and as an investment, and that animals for fattening 
have the same economic characteristics as unfinished products (Broeks et al., 
1991). 
Assets on the balance sheet are often valued at replacement value. This 
simplifies comparisons between farms and between regions. However, for the 
analysis of the financial position of the farmer and of investments in farming it 
also has negative consequences. The annual accounts do not show the realized 
and unrealized capital gains. Hill (1989:180) suggests that they should be 
considered when the economic position of farmers is analysed. Perhaps they 
also should be used in calculating return to capital. That discussion is related 
to the use of a gearing adjustment when applying current cost accounting 
(CCA), (Lewis and Jones, 1980). It also implies that net worth is actually 
lower than estimated in the balance sheet: as tax authorities do not recognize 
CCA, net worth includes a deferred tax claim. 
Even more problematic is the third statement of the annual accounts, 
the statement of the flow of funds (or cash flow statement). In annual reports 
of companies there is a sharp difference between the profit and loss account 
and the statement of the flow of funds. However in agriculture these are often 
mixed up (e.g., Hill, 1991; CEG, 1989:67). Based on the Dutch FADN, 
scheme 4 gives an example of such a statement. The statement shows how 
cash flows have been used to finance operations, investments and financial 
obligations. It should be noted that several types of statements exist, each with 
different methods of estimating cash flows (direct and indirect). The choice of 
appropriate indicators in this field could benefit from recent literature that 
discusses Exposure Draft 36 "Cash flow statements" of the International 
Accounting Standards Committee. In general, indicators used in agriculture 
should be discussed more often and in the framework of non-agricultural 
literature. 
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SOURCES 
Depreciation 
Current savings 
Cash flow 
Inheritances and gifts 
Subsidies on capital 
Results on disinvestements 
Other changes in net worth 
Own financing 
New long term loans 
Changes in long-term credits 
Changes in short-term liabilities 
Outside financing 
Total financing 
APPLICATIONS 
Redemption of loans 
Gross investment intangibles 
Gross investment land 
Gross investment buildings 
Gross investment machinery 
Gross investment breeding livestock 
Total gross investment fixed assets 
Changes in stocks 
Non-farm investments 
Changes in circulating capital and 
accounts receivable 
Total applications of all funds 
Scheme 4: Statement of flow of funds, format used in the Dutch FADN 
2.3 Financial situation of farms in the EC 
Based on the definitions described in the previous section, this section provi-
des some data on the use of capital and the financial situation in EC farming. 
Figures 1 and 2 relate the total farm capital (including the value of the owned 
land) to the acreage and the number of agricultural work units of the farm. 
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Farms in the Netherlands, Northern and Central Italy and along the Spanish 
coasts and Galicia have the highest investments per ha. The characteristics of 
the farm system (intensive livestock, horticulture, permanent crops) determine 
the level of investments. (Rented land is relatively scarce in some of these 
regions). The amount of capital per agricultural work unit (AWU) is low in 
the Mediterranean area, especially in Greece, Portugal and Southern Italy. The 
investments per AWU are high in Denmark, the United Kingdom, Northern 
Germany and Bavaria, Luxemburg and the wine regions Champagne Ardenne 
and Rioja. The regions in Central Spain, with their large extensive cereal 
farms, also have a high level of capital per farmer (figure 2). However, as 
output is low in many regions with a low level of investments, the amount of 
assets used to produce 1000 ECU of output is relatively high in Italy, Spain, 
Wales and Ireland. 
Legend 
assets in ECU per ha 
0 to 4000 
4000 to 6000 
6000 to 9000 
9000 to 12000 
12000 to 999999 
Figure 1: Total assets per ha, 1989 
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Legend 
assets in ECU per AWU 
M 0 to 70000 
M 70000 to 100000 
H 100000 to 120000 
M 120000 to 160000 
M 160000 to 300000 
Figure 2: Total assets per AWU, 1989 
A small example might illustrate the role that capital plays in determining the 
farm system and hence the effect of agricultural policy (Poppe and Koole, 
1991). The dairy farming system depends on relative prices. For instance in 
the Netherlands, compared to Bretagne, labour is expensive and compound 
feeds are cheap: for a Dutch dairy farmer the cost of 100 kg compound feed 
equals the costs of two and a half hours of labour (price level 1988/89). This 
statistic is nearly four hours for his competitor in Bretagne, who will therefore 
buy less compound feed and use more roughage from his own farm. That 
substitution increases the value of land as a roughage producing asset, but due 
to technical relations this effect is limited. The Dutch dairy farmer spends 
twice as much on feedstuff s per 100 kg milk than his counterpart in Bretagne. 
The result of sharing out a larger part of cultivating feedstuffs to farmers in 
the USA, Brazil and Thailand is that a Dutch farmer needs less labour per 100 
kg milk, and that milk production per ha is higher. As a result land prices are 
higher in the Netherlands than in other regions: in Bretagne the value of less 
than 500 hours of (non-agricultural) work buys a ha of land, against nearly 
2000 hours in the Netherlands (prices 1988/89). These relatively high land 
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prices force individual farmers to have a land-intensive farming system; they 
could otherwise not meet the resulting financial obligations. This small 
example shows that relative prices of labour, capital, other inputs and outputs 
determine the farm system and hence the amount of capital per ha and per 
farmer. Using a lot of capital can result in a difficult inter-generational 
transfer of the farm (a subject discussed in more detail in a later section) and 
in high indebtedness. This is most likely to occur on large (efficient) farms 
operated by young farmers. These farms are very sensitive to drastic changes 
(like severe price cuts or a limit per ha on payments per head) in agricultural 
policy. 
Indebted farms are mainly found in Northwestern Europe: solvency is 
low in the Netherlands and in several French regions, and extremely low in 
Denmark. On the other hand it is high in Italy, Spain, Portugal and on the 
Greek islands. In all regions of Southern Europe, the debts are less than 5% 
of the total value of the farm (figure 3). 
Debts as such are not a problem. Only in combination with a low cash 
flow can they cause troubles. Figure 4 shows for how many years of total 
family farm income (1989 level) are needed to pay off all the existing debts of 
the farm1. In Italy, Spain and Portugal (with the exception of the Alentejo) the 
debts are equivalent to a few months of income. The average farmer in most 
German and French regions would need his total farm income for 2 to 3.5 
years to redeem all his loans. The Dutch, Danes, Englishmen and the Scots, 
together with farmers in Western France, the Central Massif and Southwestern 
Germany would need on average even more than 3.5 years of income. 
Farms, production, capital and loans are distributed very unevenly 
between the member states (table l2). Compare for instance France and Italy: 
one in eight (12,5%) of the EC farms is located in France and in 1989 they 
were responsible for more than one fifth (22.3%) of total production. French 
farmers have, however, taken up one third of all the agricultural liabilities in 
the EC, backed by 15% of the farm-owned assets. In contrast, nearly one in 
three of the EC farms is located in Italy, and they were responsible for nearly 
one fifth (17,5%) of the production. These farms have taken up only 3% of 
the total credits. A comparison between countries like Denmark, the Nether-
lands and the UK on the one hand and Spain on the other hand is even more 
striking. 
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Legend 
percentage 
35 to 70 
70 to 85 
85 to 95 
95 to 97.5 
97.5 to 100 
Figure 3: Solvency, 1989 
ye. »f, 
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Legend 
# of years 
0 to 0.2 
0.2 to 0.75 
0.75 to 2 
2 to 3.5 
3.5 to 12.6 
Figure 4: Indebtedness: payback period, 1989 
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Table 1 : Share of EC member states in the number of farms, total output, total farm 
owned assets *) and total liabilities, 1989 
Member state 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Ireland 
UK 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
EC 
Farms 
8.3% 
12.5% 
30.8% 
1.2% 
0.1% 
2.1% 
1.8% 
3.1% 
3.2% 
11.1% 
15.8% 
9.9% 
100% 
Output 
16.0% 
22.3% 
17.5% 
2.9% 
0.1% 
8.8% 
4.3% 
2.4% 
10.7% 
3.7% 
9.0% 
2.4% 
100% 
Assets 
14.3% 
15.0% 
22.8% 
1.5% 
0.1% 
7.0% 
2.7% 
3.8% 
11.3% 
3.9% 
14.5% 
3.0% 
100% 
Liabilities 
20.3% 
32.5% 
2.8% 
3.0% 
0.1% 
15.6% 
11.4% 
1.5% 
10.1% 
0.9% 
1.1% 
0.7% 
100% 
*) excluding the value of rented landed, which differs between member states. 
Source: adapted from CEG-RICA 
Literature that explains the differences in the financial situation between 
the European regions is scarce, and it often only provides descriptions, 
without explanations. Hullot and Loyat (1990) applied principal components 
analyses and hierarchical clustering to the F ADN data of 1986 to identify 
thirteen clusters of regional farm types (annex 1). 
The results of that study show a clear north/south division. Farms in 
the north are more indebted and thus more integrated in the capital markets 
than in the south, where farms remain more self-sufficient. A complete and 
theoretically funded explanation has not yet been offered. 
From an economic point of view one would expect that the perceived 
rate of return (net of inflation) and opportunity cost of the capital, risk and the 
fiscal treatment of debts play a role in the organization of the farm and its 
financial structure3. However, as equity, management and labour are often 
provided by the farm family (which hampers the calculation of the rate of 
return on equity) and as fiscal and legal aspects of farming are not well 
documented throughout Europe, it is difficult to provide a complete picture. 
Nevertheless, more effort should be made in this area, for the sake of scien-
tific theory and policy making. 
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Table 2: Solvency (net worth in a % of total capital) according to the 
manager for different member states, 1988/89 
Age 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Ireland 
UK 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
EUR-12 
all 
78 
67 
98 
72 
80 
66 
37 
94 
87 
96 
99 
96 
84 
< 25 
78 
50 
98 
34 
79 
60 
11 
94 
88 
98 
99 
94 
76 
25-35 
75 
56 
97 
53 
70 
53 
13 
93 
86 
95 
98 
96 
74 
35-45 
76 
65 
97 
71 
82 
62 
27 
92 
86 
95 
99 
95 
80 
45-55 
80 
75 
98 
81 
86 
70 
38 
93 
85 
96 
99 
96 
86 
age of the farm 
55-65 
80 
80 
99 
85 
82 
76 
51 
97 
87 
98 
100 
98 
90 
> 65 
82 
77 
98 
94 
85 
79 
67 
98 
90 
99 
99 
98 
93 
Source: CEG-RICA 
share of 
total 
% 
liabilities 
Figure 5: The share in total liabilities (left) and total assets (right) of farms classified 
according to age of the farm manager, 1988/89. Source: adapted from CEG-
RICA 
Financing in Western European Agriculture 25 
In comparing average data of regions, the life cycle effect of finance 
has to be considered. The data show that the average age of the farmer is an 
important factor as younger farmers are more indebted (table 2). In several 
member states, and in the EC as a whole, farmers in the age-class 35-45 years 
have on average larger farms (and a higher net value added) than younger and 
older farmers. Based on F ADN data it can be estimated that 37% of the farms 
have a manager who is younger than 45 years. These farms control 39% 
percent of the total assets and realize 42% of the total aggregated net value 
added. However, they have 57% of the liabilities and pay 57% of the total 
interest (figure 5)4. 
The structure of the banking industry could also have an effect on 
indebtedness: some argue that in a heavily competitive industry without 
specialized agricultural banks, farmers have easier access to loans (based on 
the value of their land) or only at terms comparable to other sectors (like 
variable interest rates), and are more likely to default. This hypothesis could 
be tested by comparing different member states (e.g., Denmark and England 
compared with France and the Netherlands). 
In addition to economic factors, some would argue that farm manage-
ment styles have an influence (Van der Ploeg et al., 1992): some farmers 
prefer to stay independent of banks or the agribusiness that provides long-term 
contracts, while others are less averse to integrating in the market. Their 
preference is based on economic, but also sociologie or psychologic motives. 
2.4 Land 
Land prices are often high in regions that have high economic performance. 
One explanation is put forward by Von Thiinen: the land price contains a rent 
that reflects a comparative advantage in transport costs. Another explanation 
could be that in these regions the non-farm sector sometimes influences land 
prices by creating extra demand for housing, roads, recreation and nature 
preserves. Probably the main reason is that the regional economies provide 
off-farm employment for this and the next generation and pushes up the 
opportunity cost of labour. This leads to the introduction of labour saving 
technologies (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985) that are capital intensive. Optimal use 
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of these technologies by existing farmers (who individually have a low 
opportunity cost for their labour) leads to a high marginal value for land 
(assuming that the profitability of the innovations is related to the scale of the 
farm; Veerman, 1983). As a result the marginal value of land will be higher 
than in a situation with less (human) capital. 
Annex 2 provides some information on the relation between farm 
income and land prices in the EC. Although the quality of the data is far from 
perfect5, this cross section analysis shows that there is a clear relationship 
between Family Farm Income per hectare and the land value in several types 
of farming. Mediocre results for some types of farming can be influenced by 
the fact that data from only one year have been used, without paying attention 
to price bubbles6. In addition, land prices can be influenced by expected 
capital gains (see Daouli and Demoussis [1992] for a recent analysis of Greek 
data). 
Since at least the Middle Ages the best agricultural regions have also 
had the most thriving regional economies. More backward regions tend to be 
less favoured in an agricultural sense: the backwardness of agriculture in 
LFA-regions can at least partly be explained by a less developed regional 
economy. Due to the subsistence character of agriculture in the recent past in 
these regions, the agricultural structure remains small-scale (measured in 
output, not in ha). Probably less has been invested in modern techniques. 
Land values reflect the marginal character of these areas. If such regions are 
part of a richer member state of the EC, relatively high subsidies per ha are 
handed out to conserve this situation (Tamminga et al., 1991). 
Even where subsidies exist, the total gap in family farm income 
between less favoured and normal areas is rarely bridged. Other indicators for 
the financial position of farms in less favoured areas are not so negative (table 
3). Although the value of the land is lower in LFAs than in normal areas, the 
farms are often bigger (measured in ha) and less burdened with debts. 
Solvency is therefore often higher: the low profitability of farming in LFAs 
does not allow a high indebtedness. The pay back period of the liabilities 
(measured in the number of years that total family farm income would be 
needed to repay the loans) is at the same level for LFA and non-LFA groups 
in most member states. This is in line with the analysis of Zeddies (1991), that 
also showed little difference between LFA and non-LFA regions in the 
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number of viable farms for each member state (with the exception of Ger-
many). 
Table 3: Financial situation on farms in less favoured areas (lfa) compared with 
'normal' areas (nrml), per farm type and member state, three year averages 
1987-1989 
FFI 1) Loans 2) Solvency 3) Payback 4) Land 5) 
nrml lfa nrml lfa nrml lfa nrml lfa nrml lfa 
Dairy farms 
Germany 
France 
Belgium 
Ireland 
UK 
19.0 
16.3 
35.3 
24.0 
35.4 
16.2 
13.1 
30.5 
13.4 
28.6 
63.7 
48.6 
50.6 
22.6 
68.3 
54.2 
42.9 
44.8 
7.1 
39.0 
77 
69 
74 
92 
86 
78 
70 
74 
95 
89 
3.36 
2.97 
1.43 
0.94 
1.93 
3.35 
3.28 
1.47 
0.53 
1.36 
6243 
2895 
12340 
4517 
6392 
5607 
2337 
4918 
3106 
3033 
Drystock farms 
France 
Belgium 
Ireland 
UK 
Spain 
13.7 
42.2 
6.8 
8.3 
7.6 
12.4 
34.6 
5.8 
13.6 
6.4 
54.5 
50.2 
11.0 
30.7 
1.3 
47.5 
62.6 
2.9 
32.8 
1.2 
71 
76 
95 
91 
98 
74 
77 
97 
89 
98 
3.98 
1.96 
1.63 
3.68 
0.17 
3.85 
1.81 
0.51 
2.40 
0.19 
2300 
8638 
4307 
4458 
2233 
2009 
4254 
2198 
1422 
2318 
General cropping 
Italy 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
9.5 
2.1 
8.1 
3.1 
7.4 
1.8 
6.5 
3.3 
1.7 
0.8 
1.7 
1.3 
1.4 
0.6 
0.9 
1.1 
99 
96 
99 
97 
99 
96 
99 
97 
0.18 
0.40 
0.21 
0.41 
0.19 
0.35 
0.14 
0.32 
12592 
3442 
4527 
6729 
9965 
2016 
3157 
3489 
Permanent crops 
Italy 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
7.4 
2.4 
3.6 
3.6 
7.3 
1.7 
5.9 
2.6 
1.1 
0.4 
0.5 
1.7 
2.6 
0.3 
0.4 
1.2 
99 
98 
99 
98 
97 
98 
100 
98 
0.14 
0.16 
0.15 
0.47 
0.36 
0.17 
0.07 
0.45 
14649 
4145 
9656 
6768 
15019 
2762 
7042 
4129 
1) Family Farm Income in 1000 ECUs 
2) Total liabilities in 1000 ECUs 
3) Solvency: net worth in % of total assets 
4) Total liabilities divided by the family farm income: income of .. years is needed to pay 
back the total loans. 
5) Implicit value of land and permanent crops per ha of owned land. 
Source: RICA, adaption LEI-DLO 
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Such analyses can provide clues for values at which land in Central and 
Eastern Europe could be privatized. For farmers in these countries it is 
interesting to know that private farms can do well even without owning the 
land. In large parts of Europe land can be rented on long-term contracts, but 
there are big differences between regions. For instance regions in (western) 
France are characterized by a high percentage of leased land, while farmers in 
Denmark, Ireland and England often own their land. The leasing of land is 
often governed by law to maintain the quality of the land and to give the 
farmer a preferred access to a renewal of his lease-contract. 
The lease-price is sometimes set by the government (e.g., in the 
Netherlands) but the opposite exists too. Some contracts in France quote a 
lease price in kg of agricultural products (wheat), which in effect is a system 
of share-lease. In times of increasing prices the first seems attractive from the 
farmer's point of view, but policy makers should realize that a price control 
can lead to a declining area of land available for leasing. The area of rented 
land in the Netherlands decreased from 50% in the sixties to 35% today, 
where the area in Belgium and Germany were stable or increased. This is 
partly blamed on the fact that private investors found it attractive to sell the 
previously rented land on the free market at the moment the lease contract was 
ended by the farmer (Van Bruchem et al., 1989). The investors could then 
earn a so-called premium for vacant possession (Currie, 1981). 
2.5 Financing the succession of the farm 
Land ownership with high land values hampers the inter-generational transfer 
of a farm. While equity in a limited company is permanent capital, the net 
worth of a family farm partly disappears during or shortly after the transfer 
from one generation to the next. Farmers often invest nearly all their capital in 
the farm, including funds needed for their own pension or in case they become 
disabled. Transfer of the farm to the successor therefore involves a flow of 
money out of agriculture. 
This flow is even greater if the children who leave agriculture demand 
their own share of the family capital. Differences in inheritance law, taxation 
and in culture influence the methods of succession in the European regions. 
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Civil inheritance law is based on the equality of all heirs. In an impressive 
survey of agricultural inheritance laws in Western Europe, Winkler (1991) 
shows that most countries have introduced special regulation for the succession 
of farms. This is to prevent inherited farms from being burdened with excess-
ive debts or being divided into uneconomical parts. Winkler (1991) adds that 
state control of the trade in farm real estate can act as a substitute for inherit-
ance laws by restricting this split up. He expects that the current trend of 
introducing special regulations governing the succession of farms (especially in 
countries operating under a Roman-based legal system) will continue. The 
justification for having an agricultural inheritance law is that it ensures that 
inherited farms will remain viable. This implies that preference should be 
given to the beneficiary best fitted to manage the farm. Formulas to arrive at 
the amount of compensation to be paid to the remaining heirs are especially 
important. However, it should be noted that the absence of legislation could 
have its own merits. Winkler (1991) suggests that in such a situation real 
estate mobility would be higher with a consequent increase in the proportion 
of leased land and more structural change. 
Young farmers are often not able to buy their parents' farm because the 
market value of the fixed assets (especially land and tradeable quota) is based 
on the marginal value of the assets for existing farms. A "complete" farm as a 
functioning business ('going concern') could easily be worth less than its 
stripped assets, if these include land. Where non-agricultural firms often 
contain goodwill most farms are characterized by "badwill". 
In family farms the amount of "badwill" depends on the opportunity 
cost of labour. If market rates were applied to remunerate the family labour 
input, then only a very small percentage of Dutch dairy farms could generate 
a return to capital that is comparable with market interest rates. Luijt and 
Hillebrand (1992) showed that the presence of an heir and knowledge on the 
availability of fixed inputs, make a prediction possible on the probability of 
succession. The results showed that family members usually take over the 
fixed inputs at a considerably reduced price and that this determines the 
probability of a dairy farm being continued. Family members actually took 
over the parental farm if they could earn 11 guilders an hour, whereas about 
14 guilders was paid for non-family workers. 
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Table 4: Average investments on Dutch dairy farms 
Hectares (owned and rented) 
Number of cows 
Number of cows per ha 
Milk production / cow (kg) 
Total milk production (kg) 
Milk production per ha (kg) 
Total milk quota (kg) 
Assets (in HFL/farm): 
- land (market value) 
- other tangible assets 
- intangible assets (quota) 
* bought (historic price) *) 
* granted (market value) **) 
Assets per 100 kg of milk (in HFL): 
- land (market value) 
- other tangible assets 
- intangible assets (quota) 
* bought (historic price) *) 
* granted (market value) **) 
Total assets per 100 kg of milk (in HFL) 
1983/84 
24.8 
57.5 
2.3 
5458 
313,835 
12,654 
380,000 
12,654 
1.21 
1.96 
3.17 
1990/91 
29.1 
51.4 
1.8 
6564 
337,390 
11,594 
334,666 
658,700 
928,100 
58.800 
945.198 
1.95 
2.75 
0.18 
2.80 
7.68 
% change 
+ 17 
-11 
-22 
+20 
+ 8 
-4 
+73 
+51 
+61 
+40 
+ 142 
*) after depreciation over a 15 year period 
**) at a modest ƒ 3.- per kg minus book value of bought quota, thus including capital 
gains on bought quota 
Source: Dutch FADN 
In the last ten years the Common Agricultural Policy tried to solve its 
financing difficulties by the introduction of quota. If these quota are tradeable 
(on their own or tied to the land), this can lead to inflated balance sheets as 
the discounted value of future cash flows shows up in the value of quota. 
Table 4 shows how the introduction of milk quota for Dutch dairy farms led to 
an increase in the use of capital. A rough estimate7 suggests that during the 
period of the quota system, the value of assets (excluding land and quota) per 
kg of milk increased by 40% in nominal terms (inflation over that period was 
8.8%). Although output increased (+ 8%), this is partly due to idle capacity 
of land and buildings: the number of cows and the stocking rate decreased. 
Farmers started buying quota (tied to the land) or leased quota to employ this 
idle capacity. In 1990/91 farmers had on average ƒ 3.50 of quota costs 
(leasing, calculated interest and depreciation of bought quota) for every 100 kg 
of milk produced. That is equivalent to nearly 5% of the milk price. If, in the 
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future, more quota are transferred to new users, this percentage will rise 
dramatically. The quota system, with a high milk price, increased the value of 
the average Dutch dairy farm by one million guilders (ECU 430,000). 
Such a creation of intangible assets can be attractive for outgoing 
farmers, but it could hamper the succession of farms if young farmers have to 
buy the production rights. Two parties would likely favour such a payment: 
the tax authorities (if the selling leads to a capital gain that is subject to a tax) 
and the relatives of the young farmer. They could view a transfer below 
market prices as an infringement upon their inheritance. Until now the Dutch 
dairy sector solved this problem by transferring land and quota at values far 
below the market price. To prevent the risk that the young farmer sells the 
assets and cashes in on the difference, a contract is recommended that gives 
the other heirs a right of profit sharing in such a sale for the following 10 or 
15 years (Van den Hoek and Spierings, 1992). 
2.6 Farmers in financial difficulties 
As agriculture becomes more capital intensive, financial risks8 tend to increa-
se. There is little agreement in the research community on how to measure 
financial stress of farmers. It is assumed, however, that financial difficulties 
start long before farms go into bankruptcy. Often the assets are sold "voluntar-
ily", to save as much capital (and status ?) as possible. Efforts of business 
economists to predict farm failure based on accounting data of previous years 
have not been very successful. In 1966 Beaver, followed by Altman (1968), 
set the example for this type of research outside agriculture. In agriculture, 
applications (e.g., Peters, 1981; Zilahi, 1986) are hampered by the lack of 
data and theory. Frequently such studies of financial failure consist of little 
more than simple empiricism with a multitude of financial ratios, which are 
studied and discarded until a few remain that are found to be the best 'predic-
tors' of failure in the businesses under study (Hill, 1991:124). For farmers 
and their advisers it also would be more helpful if they could predict lagging 
performance of the farm instead of failure. 
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The lack of agreement and theory also shows up in the measurement of 
the actual situation regarding financial stress. Several studies (Zeddies, 1991; 
Blogowski et al., 1992; Hill, 1992) have been carried out to research the 
expent of this problem within the EC. Table 5 (based on a study currently 
executed by Hill) shows that the number of farms with a negative net worth 
has increased dramatically during the eighties, especially in Denmark, Ger-
many and France. However, in 1989 only 0.9% of the EC farms had a 
negative net worth. The trend of increasing financial difficulties is more or 
less confirmed by Blogowski et al. (1992). 
Table 5 uses statistics that are based on the balance sheet. Although a 
negative net worth is a clear sign of financial difficulty low solvency (or a 
high proportion of debt) is not. If there is a steady and large cash flow (with 
or without valuable assets as backing) there is no reason for the business to be 
financed with equity. If the return on capital is higher than the market interest 
rate, leverage is attractive from the point of view of the provider of equity. To 
strive for a low percentage of debts is in a certain sense a weakness and not a 
strength of a farm: profitability is too low to make leverage attractive. 
Table 5: Numbers of farms with total liabilities greater than total assets, by member 
state, 1981 and 1989 
Member state 
Denmark 
Germany 
France 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Other member states 
EUR-10 
Spain and Portugal 
Number of farms 
1981 
4,532 
4,819 
4,156 
5,648 
2,504 
872 
22,531 
n.a. 
1989 
11,601 
8,260 
13,462 
5,183 
966 
1,574 
41,046 
319 
% change 
1989 to 1981 
+156% 
+71% 
+224% 
-8% 
-61% 
+ 81% 
+ 82% 
Source: calculations based on RICA by Hill, 1992 
Thus it is understandable that some colleagues use income or the changes in 
net worth as a yardstick for financial stress, sometimes as an indicator of pay-
back capacity. Zeddies (1991) measured viability by classifying the farms of 
the F ADN into four categories. The first category (labelled I in table 6) 
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contains all the farms with increasing net worth and the farms with a higher 
income than the remuneration claim of family labour and family capital (la). 
So, these farms are profitable, be it with or without a withdrawal of net 
worth. This category is seen as viable because the farms are profitable (which 
allows them to attract factor inputs at market prices) or because the farm 
family is prepared to finance the losses from another source. 
Table 6: Viability of farms, estimated from FADN data 1983/84-1988/89 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Ireland 
UK 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
Percentage of farms in group* 
I 
29 
61 
16 
58 
59 
53 
59 
62 
59 
46 
70 
49 
la** 
8 
14 
8 
35 
19 
30 
14 
5 
19 
11 
16 
17 
II 
27 
18 
24 
23 
22 
23 
16 
12 
19 
22 
8 
6 
III 
19 
9 
56 
14 
11 
8 
2 
23 
18 
27 
20 
22 
IV 
25 
11 
4 
5 
8 
17 
23 
3 
4 
5 
2 
23 
Number of farms 
in IV 
92,000 
65,000 
48,000 
2,900 
200 
16,000 
20,000 
4,500 
6,000 
24,000 
12,000 
70,000 
*) see text for meaning of groups 
**) percentage of farms that is profitable (income higher than remuneration claim of own 
labour and capital) 
Source: Zeddies, 1991 
The second category (II) contains the farms with negative capital 
formation, but where the capital losses are lower than depreciation (at current 
cost level). The idea is that there could still be a positive cash flow on these 
farms. Group III contains farms in which capital losses are larger than 
depreciation, but the liabilities are smaller than the sum of current assets, 
breeding livestock and machinery. The last category (IV) contains the remain-
ing farms. The analysis carried out by Zeddies (1991) suggests that Germany, 
France, Denmark and the Netherlands rank highest among the member states 
in their percentage of farmers that are "at risk". The method used here 
indicates that many more farms are facing financial stress than Hill suggests 
(1992). Blogowski et al. (1992) also report that in the countries studied 
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(France, Denmark, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ireland) 10 to 30% of full 
time farms face financial difficulties. In their methodology they combine the 
two points of view (income versus solvency) by stating that the analysis should 
be based on a combination of the solvency and the income or internal financ-
ing. In the Netherlands we developed a cash flow approach, summarized in a 
simplified form in scheme 5. 
structural 
changes in 
cash flow 
1st year 
annuity for 
interest + 
redemptions 
cash flow 
paid interest 
redempt ions 
disposable 
cash flow 
disposable 
liquidities 
investments 
needed 
solvency 
borrowing 
capacity 
reserves 
extra con-
sumption needs 
reserves for 
extra risk and 
expansion 
Scheme 5: Scheme used in the Netherlands to calculate financial stress (simplified) 
Based on the statement of the flow of funds (scheme 4) the cash flow before 
interest payments is calculated. As profitability changes from year to year, and 
as history can be a bad predictor of the future, this cash flow is corrected for 
incidental effects, which results in a "normalized" cash flow. Deducting 
interest and redemptions gives the disposable cash flow. In theory this amount 
is available annually for extra payments to creditors, and can therefore be 
restated (by calculating an annuity) as a one-time borrowing capacity. Occa-
Financing in Western European Agriculture 35 
sionally a lack of assets (solvency) can restrict this capacity. In other cases the 
balance sheet contains current assets (like savings accounts) that are not 
needed for farm operations. Those disposable liquidities can be added to the 
borrowing capacity. However, not all these reserves can be used to balance 
extra business risks. It could be that investments are needed to keep the farm's 
production capacity at its current level or to approach up to date production 
standards. If, for instance, a farm has very old buildings, the cash flow and 
available liquidity will be relatively high. The scheme would then overestimate 
the reserves available to take up extra risks. 
Based on this scheme, Mulder (1991) developed a model to estimate the 
short- and medium-term continuity of the farm. It is often used to estimate the 
effects of proposed agricultural and environmental policies. Scheme 6 gives a 
simplified presentation. 
Type Main characteristics 
Bad Normalized cash flow too low to pay costs, taxes and private consumption 
Poor Disposable cash flow is negative 
Moderate Reserves (based on the borrowing capacity and disposable liquidity) are too 
small to finance all investments needed to maintain up-to-date production 
capacity 
Fair Reserves are high enough to finance investments needed to maintain up to date 
production capacity, but too small to finance expansion 
Good Reserves are high enough to finance expansion 
Scheme 6: Typology of farms, based on the level of available funds for continuity in the 
short- and medium-term. Source: adapted from Mulder, 1991 
Frengley and Johnston (1992) used the ratio between interest payments 
and consumption as a measure for financial stress. They argue that the 
individual's perception and expectations about future events should be cons-
idered: a low present income with poor future prospects must undoubtedly be 
more stressful than if future prospects are bright. Faced with fluctuating 
incomes, farmers save and withdraw money from their reserves to support a 
desired level of household consumption (or utility). When farmers use reserves 
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to support current consumption needs, they do so at the expense of future 
consumption, suggesting that they consider themselves to be more stressed 
now than they foresee themselves being in the future. Then their 'marginal 
consumption time preference rate' exceeds the market interest rate and the 
expected return on invested funds: consumption now is preferred above more 
consumption in the future (Frengley and Johnston, 1992). Their analysis of 
data on sheep and beef farmers in New Zealand shows a clear relationship 
between the (adjusted) household stress indicator and solvency. 
Although detailed research into the history of farms currently at risk is 
not available, several studies on financial stress suggest that most problems 
arise from investment decisions by farmers that (with hindsight!) should be 
classified as wrong. In periods with high incomes and low (sometimes even 
negative) real interest rates, expansion is financed with debts, sometimes 
secured with inflated prices of fixed assets. Timing is essential in this case: if 
the situation stays unchanged for some years, debt can partly be paid off and 
the farm prospers. But if the boom ends sooner than expected or real interest 
rates shoot up, severe difficulties can result. As stated above, for young 
farmers the taking over of the farm is a huge investment, but they are not the 
only category that run the risk of financial difficulties. Efficient farmers, with 
large cash flows, who have paid off a part of their original debts and then 
enlarge their farm (sometimes because a successor is in sight) can overplay 
their hand. 
2.7 Financing market development9 
The future of farming depends not only on the decisions of the farmers but 
also on the actions taken by the food industry, especially now that agricultural 
policies show signs of becoming more market oriented. This section highlights 
agricultural co-operatives and the financial relationship with their members. 
Agricultural co-operatives are developing new strategies to cope with 
the changes in the mature food and agribusiness industry. Co-operatives have 
to compete within an oligopolistic setting. This means that their major com-
petitive instruments are product innovation, market segmentation, optimaliza-
tion of product portfolios and internationalization. Market share, strong brands 
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and proven marketing and distribution methods are key instruments for 
success. 
As a marketing oriented firm the co-operative requires more capital 
than is needed for investment in physical equipment and buildings to process 
the farmers' produce. The investments that are evoked by the changing 
strategies are risky. Often it will be impossible to measure the profits of these 
investments directly. Sometimes (like research and development of new 
products, developing new brands, buying other firms or brands by paying 
goodwill) the costs of these investments are calculated immediately or over a 
very short period. That depresses "profits" or net worth. 
As most co-operatives are already heavily indebted, it is unlikely that 
these investments can be financed by additional loans. In such a situation a 
risk-bearing capital injection is needed. Sometimes outsiders can provide risk-
bearing capital. One method is to float subsidiary companies, or even the co-
operative firm itself, on the stock market. This method has been used by Irish 
dairy co-operatives (Dijsselbloem et al., 1991). 
If the co-operative wants to attract more capital from its members, it 
has to examine the decision making process of its individual members. In 
general, the 'typical' member does not exist: there are poor and rich, young 
and old, risk-averse and innovative members. Finance proposals that call on 
all members and to provide capital with the same obligations have a small 
chance of success. Heavily indebted members lack the money and members 
with a very profitable farm can often make a higher profit by investing in their 
own farm. 
A breakdown of the dairy farms into three groups, depending on the 
size of their investment in cooperatives (table 7) suggests that differences 
between members are greater than is often assumed. Larger farms have higher 
investments in the co-operatives, even relative to their economic size, total 
output or total farm assets. These larger farms have above average incomes, 
and they invest not only in their co-operatives but also outside agriculture (in 
stocks, bonds and long-term bank deposits). 
A similar difference between farms is revealed by a breakdown accord-
ing to the age of the farmer (Van Dijk and Poppe, 1992). Older farmers 
without a successor have provided relatively more capital to their co-operative 
than younger farmers or even farmers from the same agegroup with a sue-
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cessor. It is also clear that farmers have to allocate their cash flow to invest-
ments in their farm (e.g., fixed assets), in their co-operative or outside 
agriculture. 
Table 7: Classification of Dutch dairy farms in three groups, depending on their level of 
investments (in Dutch guilders per farm) in forward and backward stages of the 
product chain, 1989 
Level of investment 
Liquid co-op. participation 
Fixed co-op. participation 
Shares 
Other participations 
Total investment *) 
- per sfu **) 
- in % farm output 1988/9 
- in % total assets 
Characteristics of the farms 
Economic size in sfu **) 
Family farm income 
Investments during the year: 
- in fixed assets 
- in financial securities ***) 
Average 
2741 
18282 
155 
3 
21211 
100 
6.6% 
1.5% 
212 
125,566 
73,318 
3600 
Low 
150 
2302 
9 
64 
2525 
14 
1.0% 
0.2% 
178 
100,140 
68,265 
30 
Medium 
2386 
12436 
4 
0 
14826 
81 
5.5% 
1.2% 
184 
116,752 
67,857 
1000 
High 
5669 
39959 
450 
33 
46111 
168 
10.7% 
2.6% 
274 
159,574 
83,755 
9900 
excluding short term accounts receivable based on product deliveries. Participation in 
co-operatives include members titles and long-term loans. Liquid participation means 
that the money will be paid (back) to the member at his first request. For fixed 
participation time has to pass (revolving loans) or the membership has to end. See 
Zwanenberg (1992) for the difficulties in classifying the capital of co-operatives 
** sfu (standard farm unit) is a measure for the size of the farm, based on the net value 
added 
*** (personal) financial securities like stocks, bonds and savings deposits, excluding 
investments in agriculture 
Conventional co-operative theory states that if investments are to be 
made in co-operatives, these should be in proportion to the member's trade 
with the co-operative. Otherwise the risk of conflicting interest between 
product suppliers and capital owners occurs. The analysis above suggests that 
in practice this relationship between investments and trade is weak, e.g., due 
to the voluntary regime of some loans by members or to the length of the 
membership period. Remuneration of the invested capital could make farmers 
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more willing to provide additional capital. 
Capital seems to be the scarcest factor in today's co-operatives. This 
implies that discussions on financing the co-operative strategies are funda-
mentally important. Fundamental because members increasingly become 
suppliers of capital as well as suppliers of raw materials. Fundamental also 
because the rate of return on these investments becomes increasingly import-
ant. 
To manage the investments and to show their performance, the new 
strategies will influence the internal organization of the co-operative, which is 
characterized by first stage and second stage activities. First stage activities 
are the traditional ones: buying, selling and processing raw materials into bulk 
commodities (e.g., unbranded meat, butter and some traditional cheeses). 
Second stage activities are the proposed new ones such as branded consumer 
goods, specialties, international activities etc. Separating these two stages (also 
into subsidiaries) makes the value added and the return on investment of the 
second stage more clear. Second stage activities can be managed on return on 
investment. This will make the co-operative management more accountable to 
the members. 
Subsidiaries with second stage activities should be free in buying their 
raw materials. That keeps them market oriented and makes it possible for 
them to fulfil their only objective: profit earning. Second stage subsidiaries are 
able to attract risk-bearing capital more easily through the stock market. Co-
operative members do not have to provide all the necessary capital. In this 
organizational model they retain their influence (as the co-operative is at least 
a majority shareholder) and the activity and its demand for raw materials (as 
long as the members' produce has the desired quality) stays in the region. 
Such a distinction between first and second stage activities demands that an 
undisputed transfer price be calculated. Although sometimes denied by 
scholars, this is often possible: the second stage activities are then not the 
single outlet of the members' produce and market prices are made available 
for other European regions. 
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2.8 The role of agricultural policy 
Is the financial stress that farmers face an argument for policy intervention? 
There seems to be no agreement on this point nor on the way the intervention 
should be conducted. The survey by Blogowski et al. (1992) shows that 
several member states took action to support farms with financial difficulties. 
Intervention takes the form of support for all farms (e.g., interest subsidies) or 
for individual farms (e.g., income support or providing security). However, 
the United Kingdom has always refused to make such interventions. 
The disadvantages of a policy that tries to relieve financial stress is that 
it can easily become counter-productive. General measures like interest 
subsidies, in particular, lower the cost of capital and provide farmers with 
incentives to invest and to become too indebted. 
Due to the increasing role of capital in agriculture, the first step should 
be to provide farmers with a stable business environment. This type of support 
fosters optimal decision making on investments in fixed assets. Clear and 
long-term monetary and fiscal policies (which determine real interest rates) 
and agricultural price policies are needed. Uncertainty created by long-lasting 
discussions on, e.g., the GATT or environmental policies is a seed for stress, 
be it financial or otherwise. 
Although the introduction of quota can provide farmers with an attract-
ive cash flow and a new category of assets, the long-term effect is an increase 
in capital requirements of the production system. Part of this capital disap-
pears with the transfer of the farm to the next generation. High output prices 
have the same effect by inflating land prices. 
The data of the FADN can be used to calculate the effect of lower 
output prices (without compensation tied to the land) on land values and 
financial obligations. Annex 3 contains the results of a theoretical experiment. 
The calculations suggest that a total liberalization of prices would decrease 
solvency in arable and dry stock farming by 10 to 20 percentage points. In 
North-Western Europe banks could face a stark increased risk in their port-
folio, even if farmers with low incomes were compensated by a personal 
income transfer. A financial restructuring would lead to lower interest pay-
ments and lower land leases, but calculations show that this effect is rather 
small compared to the effect of lower prices on income or on land values. 
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Policy makers can influence the capital intensiveness of the production 
process by other means, as well. The farmer does not necessarily have to own 
all the assets that are needed for the production process. Land can be rented, 
quota and machinery can be leased or the work can be shared with a contrac-
tor (Reinhard, 1993). Contract production can lessen the need for working 
capital (Boehlje, 1992). Eastern and Western European countries should 
realize that the legal system (especially in the land market) should support this 
sub-contracting. The milk quotas in the EC are an example of increasing state 
influence: after the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium, France is now 
the fifth country in the EC that has introduced leasing. The same applies to the 
credit system: the EC should provide possibilities to finance investments in 
land at medium- or long-term fixed interest rates. The advisory system and 
education should help farmers make important strategic decisions for which 
their daily work does not prepare them. Note also that taxes on labour and 
income raise the opportunity cost of labour and its relative price compared to 
capital (Chambers et al., 1987). This in turn makes the production process 
more capital intensive. 
If all these conditions are fulfilled and there is still a need to do more 
for capital intensive farms, interventions based on the individual situation of 
the farmers are attractive. Such schemes make efficient use of public money. 
An example from the Netherlands is the Capital Guarantee Fund that acts as a 
surety, giving security to commercial banks in cases where not enough assets 
are available (Mulder and Venema, 1992; Dijsselbloem et al., 1993). Another 
example is the programme for income support introduced in 1989 by the 
European Community (EC Regulation 768/89 known in French as "PARA"). 
Member states are allowed to draw up a programme that provides a digressive 
payment (not tied to prices or the size of the farm) for specific target groups 
during a period of up to 5 years. The (individual) farmers that receive support 
should have a total family income per work unit that is lower than 70% of the 
average national income, measured over a period of more than 1 year. The 
programme has been put into practice in member states including France 
(sheep and beef) and the Netherlands (arable farming), but evaluations are not 
yet available. Farmers with financial difficulties will especially benefit from 
such a regulation. Note that such programmes can only be evaluated by using 
data on non-farm income (Brangeon et al., 1992). 
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Reform is high on the agenda of agricultural politics (Carr, 1992). In 
the EC payments per hectare replace price support as far as arable production 
concerns (the "MacSharry decisions"). Traditional arguments for intervention 
(food security, increased productivity, farmers' living standards, consumer 
prices, market stability) are being supplemented by new ones, like the man-
agement of agricultural landscapes and the preservation of rural communities. 
In the long run these new policy objectives do not necessarily need an 
agricultural policy. Keeping rural communities alive requires just as much a 
regional policy (along with other policy instruments). The management of 
agricultural landscapes (if the public does not vote for wilderness as an 
attractive option) does not justify high premiums per ha or per head that lead 
to high stocking rates and farm systems that are not sustainable from an 
environmental point of view. Add "subsidiarity" to this view and it is even 
unclear why the flow of agricultural payments from Brussels should be so 
high. 
However, with the public choice theory in mind, it seems realistic to 
expect that these new policy objectives will be embraced by the CAP, to 
secure its future. In the past academics have argued that wealth (net worth) 
should be considered in any full assessment of a farmer's economic position10. 
And they showed that the price support benefited large and rich farmers, and 
especially landowners, more than others. Nevertheless the agricultural price 
policy and not (only) the income policy is used to improve low farm incomes. 
Thus, contributions to the discussion will be more fruitful if they direct the 
current policy instruments towards the new policy objectives rather than trying 
to dismantle them. 
The system recently introduced by the EC in arable farming (featuring 
payments per hectare and an obligation set aside for large areas) has been met 
by some criticism (De Veer et al., 1992). Defenders of the payments per 
hectare consider them to be remuneration for the fixed capital costs, as the 
market price for the outputs tends to reward only the variable production 
costs. It is debatable whether capital intensiveness as such is an argument for 
policy intervention. Considering the new policy objectives, it is also unjustifi-
able to differentiate the payments to the level of production per hectare. That 
brings the highest premiums to the regions where the demand for land for 
other uses (housing, recreation, nature) is highest, and where rural commun-
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ities are less threatened. Differentiated payments per ha do not support the 
required changes in land use. Such payments are only defensible on the 
grounds of justice and fair play: in the last 25 years farmers have been given 
strong incentives to invest in land (and quota) at inflated prices and to finance 
this with interest bearing debts. That cannot be changed immediately without 
compensation. Current payments per ha are therefore exactly what their 
official name is: compensation payments. 
De Veer et al. (1992) argue that this system will be too expensive, not 
auditable and therefore unmanageable. In the light of new societal demands, 
they therefore argue in favour of replacing all agricultural price policies with a 
payment per ha. They make a plea for more research on such a solution. 
All these systems have the disadvantage that land prices will reflect the 
value of the payments. As everybody in a region receives the same payment, 
the price that can be paid by a very efficient farmer for the best land will 
slightly decrease. But it still means that farmers need more capital per labour 
unit than in a situation without such payments. From the point of view of the 
farmer this is only a small disadvantage (as it also provides wealth and a 
collateral for loans) compared to the advantage of getting income support. But 
it implies that a public discussion on the justification of such premiums and 
the quest for a better agricultural policy will go on. 
2.9 Concluding remarks 
European farming is still in a development process. Traditionally, peasants 
worked on subsistence farms and were only partially engaged in markets, 
which tended to work with a high degree of imperfection (Ellis, 1988). The 
modern agricultural entrepreneur is more and more integrated in the economy, 
including international capital and commodity markets. This development 
created wealth, and the remaining farmers were able to take their share by 
integration and specialization. Coinciding with the higher incomes was a rise 
in labour costs. This induces a shift towards the use of capital, which in itself 
is not problematic, but it also means a higher amount of capital per labour 
unit. In the traditional family farm equity easily disappears with the inter-
generational transfer of the farm. That is the main problem caused by the 
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increased use of capital. 
Part of the problem can be solved by further specialization: the perfor-
mance of a farmer does not depend on the ownership of land, quota or 
machines. Other solutions are found in the way the farm is transferred to the 
heir (see above). However, it is debatable whether this could save the family 
farm in all types of farming. Especially in horticulture and perhaps dairy 
farming, it is now possible to arrive at large production units by making use 
of new processes and information technology (Zachariasse, 1990). There 
seems to also be a trend of several farmers (often brothers) joining in one 
holding. The family's farm is becoming the families' farm (Bauwens et al., 
1990). Such a holding can have advantages in attracting equity, from the 
family and from non-agricultural sources. However, such holdings still have 
most of the characteristics of a family farm, so the definition of the family 
farm concept will need adaption (Reinhardt and Barlett, 1989). To quote 
Boehlje (1992) once again: 'The options and alternatives available to finance 
and organize farm and agribusiness firms are much broader than traditionally 
has been perceived. [..] If the dominant concern in the choice of the financial 
/ organizational structure is ownership / control / autonomy, then the available 
options are severely limited' (see also Fiske et al., 1986). 
The performance of farmers is very much dependent on their technical 
skills. The increased use of capital demands other skills, especially in the field 
of strategic planning. As farmers go through this process only a few times 
during their career, external advise in this process of investing and financing 
is very important. To seek such help farmers need an external orientation and 
communication skills. Education, accounting and advisory services (public or 
commercial) are just as important as the need for strategic planning. Accoun-
ting offices are especially well placed to provide assistance in financial 
matters. It is a pity that in most European countries their role in agriculture is 
limited. 
Nevertheless, it is to be expected that not all farmers will be successful 
in this field. We should not be surprised if the proportion of farmers in 
financial difficulties will increase in the next years. Policies that create a stable 
business environment, reduce the amount of capital needed or provide income 
support for those farmers who run into difficulties are therefore welcome. 
Obviously, we, as agricultural economists, also have some work to do. 
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We should look more closely at the indicators used in financial accounting. 
This should help us to more fully understand the observed differences between 
regions and farm types throughout Europe. Some co-operation with colleagues 
in (tax-) law and sociology could be beneficial in this type of research. Tool 
box and theory could be applied more often in policy analysis and in the 
advisory role. For policy analysis the relationship between the farm and the 
sector level needs more attention. As LaDue (1989) stated: 'For example, 
what percentage of U.S. farms need to have a positive net cash household 
income in order to say the condition of agriculture is good?' 
As capital becomes even more important, the academic world should 
study finance in more detail and in closer contact with non-agricultural 
colleagues. Some examples of fruitful co-operation are: the application of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model to investments in land by institutional investors, 
the influence of taxes on the choice between equity and debts, the application 
of option theory to (environmental) investments, and the application of the 
agency theory to the organization and finance of the farm and the co-operat-
ive. 
Theory combined with the data that are so widely available in agricultu-
re could foster science and support the decision making of farmers and policy 
makers. The number of farmers will inevitably decline, but the expanded role 
of capital in the agricultural sector will make additional research and education 
neccessary for this University's next 75 years. 
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Annex 1 
Classification of regional farm types according to the financial situation of 
the average farm in the farm type per region, F ADN 1986 
4 clusters with 15 a-typical cases 
Farm types: 
* Northern European horticulture: 
* Vineyards in Champagne and Bourgogne and intensive livestock in Italy 
* Beef farms in Northern Ireland 
* Danish farms and Dutch intensive livestock farms 
Characteristics: 
* High FFI per family worker and very high gross income per ECU net 
worth 
* Very high FFI per family worker and high gross income 
* Low gross income and assets are very high compared to output 
* High use of fixed assets per worker and farms are highly indebted 
4 clusters with 127 cases in the north of the EC 
Farm types: 
* French vineyards and horticulture, permanent crops in Northern Europe and 
intensive livestock in the UK, farms in Belgian and Luxembourg' 
* Farms in Northern Germany and in the Paris basin, arable and dairy farms 
in the UK and the Netherlands 
* Farms in Southern Germany, dry stock farm in Southern France, French 
arable farms, intensive livestock in Greece 
* Drystock farms in the UK and farms in Ireland 
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Characteristics: 
* A low % of net value added is paid out as interest and intermediate costs 
are small compared to output (margins are high), or a high percentage of 
net value is paid out as interest, low margins and: 
* FFI per family worker is high, or FFI per family worker is low and: 
* Assets are high compared to output 
* Assets are low compared to output 
J clusters with 141 cases in the south of the EC 
Farm types: 
* Dairy and drystock farms in Italy and arable farms in Italy and Spain 
* Farms in the Southern Portugal 
* Permanent crops in Italy and Greece, farms in the Northern of Portugal 
* Farms in the Southern Portugal 
* Horticulture in Italy, vineyards in Lombardia, arable, dairy and drystock 
farms in Greece 
* Farms in northwest, central and southeast of Spain, dairy and livestock 
farms in the north and central Spain 
Characteristics: 
* High use of fixed assets per worker and high FFI per family worker, 
or low use of fixed assets per worker, high FFI per family worker and: 
* Assets are high compared to output and a low % of net value added is paid 
out as interest, or assets are low compared to output and a high % of net 
value added is paid out as interest and: 
* Investments are high, or low investments and: 
* Low use of capital in relation to gross value added 
* High use of capital in relation to gross value added 
Source: Hullot and Loyat, 1990 
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Annex 2 
A cross section analysis on the relationship between land values and family 
farm income 
Figure A shows the value of a ha of land (including the value of the perma-
nent crops) divided by the family farm income per ha, both as measured by 
RICA in 1989. It shows that land values are relatively low in Southern Europe 
and Ireland. Land values in those regions are equivalent to less than 10 years 
of income. Land values seems to be extremely high in the centre of the EC, 
especially in France and southwest Germany as well as in Scotland. This 
result could however be due to the fact that only the data of one year are used. 
In addition, a large part of the land in France is rented (and thus excluded 
from these land values) so the land values can contain a relatively high 
proportion of land with permanent crops. 
- . * > 
Legend 
1 to 7.5 
7.5 to 10 
10 to 15 
15 to 20 
20 to 65 
Figure A: Landvalues compared to FFI, 1989 
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The data were used to perform a simple regression analysis between the land 
value per ha (LV in ECU, dependent variable) and the family farm income per 
ha (FFIHA in ECU, independent variable) for four types of farming on all 
cases where the FFIHA was positive. This produced the following results (T-
values between brackets): 
dairy farms (type 411), n = 67 
LV = 5.99 + 12.84 FFIHA R2 = 0.50 
(0.0) (8.0) 
beef farms (type 422), n = 17 
LV = -9913 + 27.68 FFIHA R2 = 0.78 
(1.19) (7.33) 
cereal farms (type 111), n — 57 
LV = 3455 + 1.29 FFIHA R2 = 0.02 
(5.89) (0.9) 
gen. cropping farms (type 121), n = 17 
LV = 4205 + 0.73 FFIHA R2 = 0.33 
(6.07) (2.69) 
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Annex 3 
The effect of lower prices on net worth and solvency 
The FADN data can be used to calculate the effect of lower prices on land 
values and financial obligations. This annex shows the results of a theoretical 
experiment. The direct effect (that is without production reactions by farmers 
and without financial compensations) of substantially lower prices on income" 
is dramatic and often leaves the average farmer with a negative income (table 
A3.1). What is of interest here, is the effect on land values. A survey of the 
literature (Luijt, 1988) shows that a decrease in output prices of 1% leads to 
prices of land and lease prices that are 0.85 to 1.7% lower. If an elasticity of 
1 (1 % decrease in output price = 1 % drop of land values) is assumed, table 
A3.2 shows the effect on net worth and solvency. The decrease in net worth 
and solvency is especially important for farm types that are dependent on land. 
Drystock farms are more hurt than dairy farms because cattle and buildings 
are more important for the latter. Regions with a high share of leased land 
(like western France) pass the decrease on to the landowners. In regions where 
farmers own the land (like Ireland and Denmark), the effect on net worth and 
solvency is greater. These farmers are already more indebted too. The 
calculations suggest that a total liberalization of prices would decrease 
solvency in arable and drystock farming by 10 to 20 percentage points. In 
regions were indebtedness is low (like southern Europe) such a change does 
not have many consequences, but in Northwestern Europe banks could face a 
stark increased risk in their portfolio, even if farmers with low incomes were 
compensated by a personal income transfer. After a financial restructuring or 
after a transfer to the next generation, the ratio between equity and debts could 
be rebalanced towards the current situation. That would lead to lower priced 
interest payments and lower land leases. Calculations show that this effect is 
rather small compared to the effect of lower prices on income or on land 
values. This is due to the large ratio between land values and income. 
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Table A 3.1: The negative effect in 1000 ECU of a sharp price decrease11 on family 
farm income per member state and type of farming 
Type of 
farming *) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
U.K. 
1100 
7.8 
13.5 
4.2 
7.6 
25.7 
15.4 
7.2 
8.1 
42.9 
1200 
32.3 
15.7 
24.4 
3.0 
8.0 
24.3 
18.3 
6.0 
23.5 
2.7 
56.8 
2000 
16.4 
30.7 
16.5 
3.9 
4.5 
13.3 
6.1 
34.1 
2.0 
42.6 
4100 
17.8 
22.9 
15.2 
3.8 
3.6 
13.3 
11.4 
10.6 
20.7 
28.3 
3.4 
27.4 
4200 
29.3 
17.2 
4.8 
5.5 
14.6 
5.0 
12.3 
15.6 
2.2 
11.2 
4300 
22.6 
16.9 
4.1 
17.3 
10.5 
12.5 
23.7 
3.1 
38.5 
4400 
3.6 
4.6 
11.2 
5.7 
7.1 
2.1 
17.7 
5000 
26.5 
42.5 
20.9 
11.9 
10.7 
24.1 
40.0 
31.4 
8.6 
47.6 
all 
21.9 
19.0 
17.0 
3.1 
5.4 
16.8 
9.0 
6.0 
19.5 
27.8 
2.2 
33.4 
*) 1100 = cereals; 1200 = general cropping; 2000 = horticulture; 4100 = specialist 
dairy farms; 4200 = specialist beef farms; 4300 = dairy and beef; 4400 = sheep and 
goats; 5000 = specialist intensive livestock; all farms include permanent crops and 
mixed farms 
Source: Poppe and Koole (1991), calculated on basis of RICA, 1988/89 
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Table A 3.2: The negative effect of a decrease of land values on net worth and solvency per 
member state and type of fanning 
Type of 
farming *) 
1100 1200 2000 4100 4200 4300 4400 5000 all 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
U.K. 
12.4 
38.4 
16.2 
26.7 
22.7 
62.1 
34.1 
7.4 
152.1 
Effect on net worth in 
31.3 
17.6 
54.5 
8.4 
23.5 
17.4 
65.3 
25.1 
54.8 
5.1 
128.4 
3.7 
2.7 
5.5 
8.5 
5.1 
6.5 
9.0 
20.1 
3.9 
23.7 
16.1 
8.5 
20.2 
5.0 
6.4 
7.5 
30.5 
16.5 
14.3 
49.3 
4.4 
48.5 
1000 ECU 
18.8 
28.8 
4.4 
8.0 
15.4 
38.9 
12.1 
12.9 
4.2 
48.4 
14.0 
24.4 
6.2 
8.7 
40.0 
21.1 
19.6 
4.5 
75.2 
3.6 
4.1 
12.7 
35.2 
15.0 
6.6 
69.1 
4.6 
8.8 
12.6 
1.7 
1.7 
3.7 
16.8 
11.7 
1.3 
20.5 
13.9 
11.0 
24.3 
10.3 
15.5 
13.1 
33.5 
18.5 
15.6 
36.5 
5.7 
73.0 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
U.K. 
9 
16 
25 
22 
13 
25 
21 
13 
22 
Effect as 
15 
9 
16 
18 
20 
10 
23 
19 
13 
13 
16 
3 
1 
3 
15 
7 
5 
9 
5 
9 
7 
% of total assets 
9 
3 
8 
9 
9 
5 
16 
7 
5 
9 
7 
12 
7 
12 
10 
11 
8 
30 
11 
4 
11 
19 
7 
10 
9 
5 
21 
8 
6 
9 
15 
11 
7 
9 
26 
10 
13 
21 
3 
2 
5 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
2 
6 
8 
5 
10 
20 
16 
8 
20 
14 
6 
8 
13 
15 
*) see table A3.1 
Source: Poppe and Koole (1991), calculated on basis of RICA, 1988/89 
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Notes 
1. This is of course a crude estimate, as this income is first of all needed to support the 
farm family (taxes and consumption). If, for example 10% of the family farm income 
is saved and available to pay of the loans, it will take 10 times as much as suggested 
in the text to replace liabilities by equity. In addition the analysis is based on the data 
of only one year, where as incomes fluctuate between years. The method is only 
applied here to allow for some comparison between regions. 
2. These figures have been calculated on the basis of the aggregated data from the 
FADN. The FADN represents "only" 95% of the production and 90% of the 
agricultural area. The agricultural structure differs between member states, and 
member states with many small holdings tend to include them in RICA, where others 
leave them out. That influences the figures, but not the conclusion. 
3. The paper by M. Mulder in this seminar provides more methodological clues on this 
point, especially from the point of view of the agency theory (Mulder, 1993). The 
paper by M. Boehlje (1992) discusses effects of control, risk and legal choices 
regarding finance. 
4. These figures have been calculated on the basis of the aggregated data from the 
FADN. As the FADN represents "only" 95% of the production and 90% of the 
agricultural area, and non-represented farms are smaller and probably less indebted, 
the real situation is even more unbalanced. 
5. The value of the land includes those of permanent crops. The family farm income is 
not necessarily equivalent to the marginal production value of land; if other produc-
tion factors (as labour, management or quota) are (quasi-)fixed, part of the rent will 
be attached to those factors. 
6. Price bubbles refer to a situation in which changes in (expected) income from land 
lead to changes in (the same and) future years (the plural and the lagging are essenti-
al). In that case the land price in a certain year is a more complicated function of 
incomes in previous years. 
7. The data in table 2 are not based on a constant sample, as a high number of small 
farms disappeared, and others became less specialized. It is also possible that farmers 
own a larger part of the land now than they did in 1983/84. These points, however, 
do not distort the increased value of quota. 
8. Business risk is defined as risk inherent in the farm, independent of the way it is 
financed and as reflected in the variability in the cash flow from operations. Financial 
risk is the risk of being unable to meet prior claims with cash generated by the farm 
(Mulder, 1993). 
9. This section is heavily based on Van Dijk en Poppe, 1992 and a forthcoming paper 
(in English) by these authors. 
10. Hill (1989) discusses the relevant literature. 
11. We assumed 40% lower prices for arable products (sugar: -50%), -20% for horticul-
ture and fruits (olives: -40%), -25% for milk, -50% for beef and sheep, -35% for 
intensive livestock and corresponding decreases for agricultural inputs. The budget 
would then be available for personal income support. More details are given (in 
Dutch) in Poppe and Koole, 1991. 
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Chapter 3 
Reform of the Farm Tenancy System: 
How the Netherlands Fits into the European Scene 
P. C. van den Noort1 
3.1 Introduction 
In the eighteenth century, land was a very important factor in European 
society; many political and other rights were attached to it. About 25% of 
national income went to landowners, who formed a small and wealthy group. 
This created various problems. People objected to (a) the lack of equity or the 
uneven distribution of income, (b) the easy way landowners became rich, (c) 
how they used their income for conspicuous consumption instead of invest-
ments for economic growth, and (d) the uneven distribution of economic and 
political power that resulted. 
Each European country reacted differently and introduced various 
policies to solve these problems. There were social revolutions (as in France), 
land reform, heavy taxation of land and of inheritances (in the UK), distribu-
tion of land to farm families (e.g., the Homestead Act in the USA), the price 
for land was pegged, and restrictive land tenure regulations were introduced. 
The Netherlands was certainly no forerunner in any of these fields. The 
French Revolution resulted in only some seigneurial rights being eliminated in 
nearby Holland. Traditionally, taxation on land has been very moderate; only 
since the beginning of the Second World War has there been a policy limiting 
the maximum price for land, and a strict regulation of the land tenure system. 
These policies and the general changes in Dutch society have completely 
changed the position of landowners and the problems they created. As a 
consequence of the price-capping and rent-capping policies for farms and land, 
the share of the land factor in agricultural income changed from the pre-war 
level of about 30% to 5% after the war, and has been maintained at that level 
ever since. The share of land in national income is now very small; less than 
1%. 
1. Department of Agricultural Economics and Policy, Wageningen Agricultural University 
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In the European context the Netherlands has rather strict and rigid legislation 
as is also the case in France, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Portugal. This 
contrasts with the more liberal legislation in Great Britain, Luxemburg, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland and the rather special systems found in 
Denmark, Finland and Ireland where landownership by farmers is openly 
preferred. 
3.2 Financing agriculture 
The economic aspect of landownership, therefore, has changed dramatically 
from a large and increasing share in national income to a small and decreasing 
one. Many laws now regulate the use of land, and landowners have to accept 
restrictions on their use and ownership. Even the last remnants of old rights 
have disappeared and the landowners have no special political position. They 
are no longer an élite, just as the tenant farmer is no longer submissive and 
poor. But, although the old problems have disappeared, the old sentiments 
remain. The problems today are not part of the struggle against feudal lords or 
against inequality; they are not large social problems but are technical challen-
ges and political struggles to finance agriculture. Landowners provide Dutch 
agriculture with capital. About 24% of total assets are financed by landown-
ers. The main function of landowners today is to be a source of capital, as are 
banks, suppliers of machinery, co-operatives and farmers' relatives. One 
source of credit is perhaps more sympathetic or cheaper than another. The 
question is whether the tenancy system in the Netherlands can provide pros-
pective farmers with land and buildings. Another problem is that the total area 
rented decreased from 1.2 million hectares in 1957 (53% of the total agricultu-
ral area) to 0.7 million hectares in 1983 (35% of the total agricultural area). 
In that period, the number of tenant farmers decreased by about 2% annually. 
3.3 Functions of tenancy 
Tenancy has at least four important functions: (1) able farmers can be helped 
to farm, even when they have inadequate capital for a family farm or a 
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commercial enterprise; (2) tenancy increases the stability of the land market; 
(3) the system attracts capital for land improvement, buildings, and even for 
new land; and (4) a good farm structure is more likely under tenancy, because 
there are fewer reasons for splitting up holdings than for splitting up owner-
operated farms. 
The capital or credit function of tenancy is still important but is decreas-
ing systematically at an annual rate of about 2%. This is a new development. 
The Netherlands has never before had so little rented land and buildings. In 
neighbouring countries this quantity is either stable or increasing. It is said 
that the main cause of the downward trend is the low level of rent and 
therefore the low rate of return for investments in land and buildings. 
In fact, the official maximum rent has lagged behind the general price 
level of goods and buildings. The rent is also out of step with the financial 
results of farming. The maintenance costs, insurance, interest rates and the 
costs of drainage have increased considerably and therefore net rent per 
hectare has decreased in real terms. Since 1941 the Dutch government has had 
a conservative rent policy, but this does not mean that the rate of return of 
tenancy was too low in the past by comparison with other investments. Table 
1 shows that this rate was high enough in the period of the decline of tenancy. 
Some landowners may object to such calculations because they only 
think in terms of the low returns (rents) and the high payments (for mainten-
ance, drainage and insurance). That equation is indeed disappointing, but from 
an economic point of view the capital gain also counts, and in fact is conside-
rable, leaving landowners with an attractive investment but perhaps with some 
liquidity problems. These net total benefits are on paper only. If a farmer 
wanted to enjoy and spend them, he would have to sell the farm! This is a 
difficult point. Many landowners are attached to their holdings and do not 
consider them as simple investments, like shares in a multinational. They also 
hate to speculate with land prices in order to obtain the maximum capital gain. 
Nevertheless, some do well and reap financial rewards. 
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3.4 Tenancy in decline 
This selling process is the main cause of the decline in tenancy in the Nether-
lands. Rented farms put up for sale are bought by farmers who themselves 
wish to farm and do not intend to rent out. Dutch law states that when a 
rented farm is put up for sale the tenant has a 'priority right' to buy the farm 
if he is willing to pay its normal market value. If he does not want to buy it 
the law indicates that he can stay on the farm for six more years even if the 
new owner wants to occupy and use his newly acquired property. A farm 
without a tenant (vacant possession) therefore has a premium, which is about 
35% of the market value, see table 2. If a holding becomes vacant, its value 
will increase by more than 50%. This is a very attractive additional profit. So 
owners try to sell the farm to farmers instead of to prospective lessors. 
Many tenant farmers use their right of priority and buy the farm them-
selves at the low value (V-P) even if they do not want to farm anymore. They 
can make a nice profit by selling their farm to prospective farmers. A farmer 
who wants to quit farming will not rent his farm to colleagues, because by so 
doing he will lose about 35% capital. Instead he will sell his farm. Nowadays 
it is even more difficult to rent a farm from a relative. If a father leases his 
farm to only one of his sons, he benefits that son out of all proportion. More 
farmer«ràrè~~therefore using other legal means to set up a farm with or for a 
son. In 1959 the area rented out by parents to their children was 223,000 
hectares: compared to only 98,000 hectares in 1983. 
Table 1: Rate of return on investments in arable farms in marine clay areas in the 
Netherlands 
Gross rent per hectare (guilders) 
Net rent per hectare (guilders) 
Rate of return (%) 
Capital gain (%) 
Rate of return on state bonds (%) 
Premium for vacant possession (%) 
Additional capital gain in the case 
of vacant possession (%) 
1970/71 
300 
150 
1.9 
5.0 
6.9 
15 
17 
1974/75 
391 
196 
1.8 
8.3 
8.5 
38 
61 
1978/79 
576 
288 
1.1 
14.1 
6.7 
39 
64 
1980/81 
550 
330 
1.6 
9.5 
7.1 
42 
72 
1982 
805 
400 
2.2 
8.4 
7.9 
35 
54 
Source: P.C. van den Noort, 1982. 'Pachtnormen, pachtservituut en de teruggang van de 
pacht in Nederland', Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 29 september 1982 
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The trend towards fewer rented farms and few (if any) new private lessors 
will continue. There are two categories of lessors that behave somewhat 
differently — the state and insurance companies. The area of agricultural land 
leased by the state has remained constant (about 190,000 hectares). There is a 
tendency to sell a number of farms each year in order to obtain money to buy 
land for nature reserves, but the state may not sell land simply for profit. 
Insurance companies have always invested in land, and this policy continues. 
This investment has a good rate of return and, unlike some private owners, 
these companies do not need the cash so urgently. So they can wait for the 
premium (P), and have in total an even higher average rate of return than 
indicated in table 1. To avoid paying the corporate tax of 48 % on the resulting 
capital gain, however, the insurance companies reinvest this capital in the 
land. 
Table 2: Estimates of the premium for vacant possession (guilders per hectare) 
Market value of farms 
Interest rate 
Interest costs 
Net rent 
Net costs 
Net costs discounted six years = 
Premium for vaccant possession 
Relative premium, estimated 
Relative premium, measured 
Additon. capital gain, estimated 
Symbol 
V 
i 
Vi 
N 
Vi = N 
c(V-N)=P 
PV 
P/(V-P) 
1970/71 
8890 
5% 
444.5 
150 
294.5 
1496 
16% 
15% 
17% 
1974/75 
17810 
8% 
1424.8 
196 
1229.3 
5679 
32% 
38% 
61% 
1978/79 
41720 
9% 
3754.8 
288 
3466.8 
15566 
37% 
39% 
64% 
1982 
26700 
10% 
2670 
400 
2270 
9897 
37% 
35% 
54% 
Source: P.C. van den Noort, 1982. 'Pachtnormen, pachtservituut en de teruggang van de 
pacht in Nederland', Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 29 september 1982 
The premium for vacant possession, rather than the low level of rents, is the 
main cause of the decline in tenancy in the Netherlands. Even if the rents 
could be increased the premium would still be considerable, (up to 25%; see 
table 3), whereas the rents would reach a high and unacceptable level. The 
cause of the decline therefore lies in the strict regulations governing tenancy, 
which were originally set up to protect the socially weak tenants. This, 
ironically, is now working to destroy the system of tenancy in the country. 
Young prospective farmers can no longer become tenants unless they can take 
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over the tenancy from their parents. Farming is increasingly becoming an 
occupation for the rich and for the well protected tenant families only. 
3.5 Policy changes 
It is time to re-evaluate the factor 'land' and the land tenure policies in the 
Netherlands. Land is no longer an important political, social and economic 
factor; neither are the landowners. The landowner nowadays must be con-
sidered as a source of credit not in the form of money but in the form of land 
and buildings. Although everything has changed dramatically, the old senti-
ments and stereotypes about landowners have unfortunately survived and have 
prevented much needed changes, not only in the level of rents but also in the 
laws. The rents are too low to maintain buildings, to improve the drainage 
system or to consolidate farms. (The latter is essential for modern agriculture). 
Low rents also result in delays in maintenance and cause problems of liquidity 
for some private landowners, forcing them to sell farms. 
Table 3: The premium for vacant possession in relative terms (P/V) as a function of 
waiting period and level of maximum rent, 1978/79 (%) 
Waiting period 
Rent per hectare 
Present level 570 gld 
2 x that level 
3 x that level 
6 years 
37 
31 
25 
5 years 
32 
26 
21 
4 years 
26 
22 
18 
3 years 
21 
18 
14 
2 years 
15 
12 
10 
1 year 
8 
6 
5 
Source: P.C. van den Noort, 1982. 'Pachtnormen, pachtservituut en de teruggang van de 
pacht in Nederland', Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 29 september 1982 
The regulations governing the security of tenants have become excessive or 
overprotective. The six-year waiting period after a rented farm has been 
bought should be reduced to two or three years (see Table 3). Unless these 
changes are implemented, tenancy decline will continue to dominate other 
trends. It is difficult to increase rents because the tenant farmers, especially 
the tenants of state-owned farms, oppose any increase and have formed a 
political coalition with the owner-farmers to protect their interests. The 
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landowners who lease land have very little political clout in the Netherlands. 
The tenant farmers are thus pursuing policies that, ironically, will lead to a 
sharp contraction in the tenancy system in the Netherlands. These policies 
have always been seen as necessary to regulate the social conflict between the 
owner and the user of land. In fact, the youngest generation of prospective 
farmers has been forgotten and this is a weak point in the policies. To help the 
young generation the law was changed in 1984, removing the right of 65-year 
olds to stay on as tenants. It was believed that this would improve the chances 
for younger tenant farmers. But, ironically, this legislation enables the owner 
to get 'vacant possession' much earlier, and therefore to make a profit earlier 
by selling the property instead of renting it to young farmers. 
Conservative rent policies prevent new investments and improvements or 
even simple upkeep, and this will hurt the tenant in the long run, even though 
it may seem like a good policy in the short run. 
The decline of the system could also be stopped by lowering the market 
price of land or farms. The policy of capping land prices, which was in 
operation until 1963, could be reinstated; the legal wherewithal exists. But it is 
unlikely that this will be realized. The measure would not be very effective in 
saving tenancy, and in any case it could not be implemented without breaking 
the coalition of farmers, because the landowning farmers would oppose the 
lower land prices! 
3.6 Conclusion 
This outline of the tenancy system in the Netherlands shows that tenants are 
not the submissive, poor farmers of former days. On the contrary, many of 
them can even afford to buy farms (costing over one million guilders) and 
they have a strong social, legal and political position. Old sentiments have 
misled policy makers, resulting in policies that will contract the system. Farm 
tenancy legislation in Belgium and Germany is in fact more relaxed in the 
sense that it doesn't create a two-price system; hence there is no difficulty 
with the premium for vacant possession. In Germany this derives from the fact 
that the owner can regain control of his land again after the end of a certain 
period of time agreed upon in the contract with the tenant. In Belgium a new 
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tenant has to pay a certain amount of money, the so-called 'chapeau' in order 
to be able to farm the land as tenant. This chapeau is equal to the premium for 
vacant possesion. It is remarkable that in these two countries the tenancy 
system is not declining, as it is in Great Britain and the Netherlands (where 
we have an uncompensated premium for vacant possession). Unless policies 
change in the Netherlands, the tenancy system will continue to decline until it 
reaches a level comparable with that in the rest of Europe, where a large 
majority (80%) of farmers own their farms. This would indeed drastically 
change the country's agricultural tradition. 
Chapter 4 
Investment Priorities in Central and Eastern European 
Agriculture 
C. Csâk? 
4.1 Introduction 
Central-Eastern Europe and the former USSR are undergoing a fundamental 
economic and political transformation. Far-reaching changes, surpassing the 
reforms of earlier years, characterize the economy of Central-Eastern Europe, 
where the creation of a new economic structure based on private ownership, and 
a market economy has begun. The former USSR is also striving to overcome 
serious economic difficulties with comprehensive economic and political reforms. 
This process has not yet been completed in any of the countries concerned: many 
details have yet to be clarified, especially in the former USSR, and there is much 
uncertainty regarding future developments. All these changes, however, will 
fundamentally reshape the agricultural economy in the region and set new 
demands for capital and priorities in investment. 
4.2 Current situation in agriculture 
The aftermath of decades of socialism is largely similar throughout the region. 
The food and agriculture of Central-Eastern Europe and the former USSR on the 
eve of the transformation was characterized by: 
— large, inefficient farms and food processing enterprises with high production 
costs; 
— a high level of food consumption relative to market economies of compar-
able prosperity; 
— subsidized food prices; 
— excess demand for food at subsidized prices; 
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— macroeconomic imbalance, including budget deficits, inflation, and foreign 
debt; 
— a pervasive monopoly in food processing and distribution. 
As far as agricultural production is concerned, the general characteristic of the 
recent past in most of the countries has been a decline in the growth rate of 
agricultural output. The explanation for this development is to be sought in the 
following factors: 
— the high degree of obsolescence of the technical basis of agricultural 
production and food processing; 
— the low yields and outdated conditions of animal farming, the acute lack of 
capital; 
— the unfavourable effects of the first steps taken in the direction of a market 
economy; and 
— the political tension and uncertainty caused by forthcoming changes. 
Central and Eastern European Agriculture 
The decline of economic activities has started already in the first half of the 
eighties in most of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs); the 
shortcomings of the centrally planned economic system became apparent long 
ago. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the recession in the West have 
exacerbated Central and Eastern Europe's already poor prospects for political 
harmony and economic recovery in 1993. The divide between Central Europe 
(Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) and the Balkans (Romania, Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia, and Albania) is deepening. Only the CE countries can be regarded 
by the EC as latter-day Greeces, Spains and Portugals, struggling to come to 
terms with political pluralism in a European context. 
The Central European economies have suffered further from a severe 
recession throughout 1993. The sharp deflationary effects of the macroeconomic 
stabilization programs that are required to counter the threat of hyperinflation are 
aggravated by the accelerated collapse of the former Soviet economic space. The 
Balkan economies' prospects are far dimmer. Industrial production declined both 
in 1991 and 1992, and inflation has reached double or triple digit percentages. 
The republics of former Yugoslavia are preoccupied by warfare. Only the mini-
economy of Slovenia has shown any sign of recovery. 
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Central and Eastern European agriculture underwent dramatic change 
during the last three years. The introduction of market pricing, open borders, and 
increased freedom of entry and exit for firms occurred in a setting that lacked the 
institutional and legal structures that are generally thought to be crucial for a well 
operating market economy. In agriculture the effect of market reforms has, in 
many ways, exemplified the positive and negative effects of these tumultuous 
changes. 
On the positive side, many of these countries have experienced shifts in 
agricultural supply and demand ranging from from pre-reform tight supplies or 
outright shortages to post-reform surpluses. Food availability and diversity has 
increased dramatically. Food prices have risen dramatically in nominal terms, but 
generally have lagged behind the overall inflation rate, reducing the relative price 
of many food items compared to other goods and services in the post reform 
period. 
On the negative side, farm financial performance has been poor, as the 
terms of trade have turned heavily against agriculture. Food price increases have 
been slower than the rate of inflation, while farm input prices equal or exceed the 
inflation rate. Land and asset ownership questions continue to plague the farm 
sector, leading to uncertainty for planting and production. Overall consumer 
demand for agricultural products is depressed from the sudden rise in the overall 
price level, while nominal income growth has been restricted and overall national 
income has fallen. In addition, the farm sector that once faced apparent unlimited 
demand for its products, now faces stiff competition from a wider array of 
consumer products. 
The very real problems faced by the agricultural sector, while fully evident 
in 1991, did not have as large an impact on production in 1991 as some might 
have expected. Gross agricultural production in the region declined by 4.9 
percent compared to 1990. Production levels in 1991 for most grains exceeded 
their 1986-90 averages, while many livestock and oilseed products fell below 
their 1986-90 levels, but remained at about their 1981-85 levels. The main 
problem appeared to be over-production rather than under-production in most of 
the countries. Declining domestic demand caused by a combination of relative 
price movements and falling real income, and disruption and stiff competition in 
foreign markets meant surpluses were the problem, rather than shortages. These 
surpluses depressed agricultural prices further and exacerbated farm financial 
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problems. It is likely that the largest adjustments in domestic demand have 
already occurred. Production further declined in 1992 and this drop in production 
was worsened by unfavourable weather conditions. 
The Central and Eastern European countries of Bulgaria, the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia 
produced 102.9 million metric tons (mmt) of grains in 1991 (5.9 percent of world 
grain production that year). This was a 12 percent increase over 1990 grain 
production, a year plagued by drought. Favourable weather more than offset the 
impact of declining input use on yields. Consumption declined for the third 
consecutive year in 1991 to 96.9 million, so that the CEE became a net grain 
exporter for the first time since 1984. The decrease in consumption resulted from 
higher prices, which cut human consumption, and a decrease in animal numbers. 
Grain production decreased in 1992 by about 15 to 20 percent in the region as 
a whole. The output was about 20 million metric tons below the 1991 level. 
The cattle sector has perhaps been the hardest hit by the changes that have 
taken place. Because most of the cattle herd in Central and Eastern Europe is 
dual purpose beef and dairy cattle, beef output is tremendously affected by policy 
changes in the dairy sector. The sharply higher prices for both meat and milk 
resulting from price liberalization measures led to a decrease in demand and 
consumption of both commodities. Falling consumer demand has put downward 
pressure on the producer price of milk. In response to low milk prices, cattle 
inventories have been cut dramatically. Because of the increased slaughter, 
production of beef and veal has declined only slightly so far. 
The CEECs are experiencing widely fluctuating hog cycles. Because hog 
producers are able to respond rapidly to changing prices, all the countries have 
seen their pork markets swing from distress slaughtering and over supply to tight 
supplies and rising prices. In all of the Central Eastern European regions, 
production declined just 1 percent in 1991, following a 2 percent decline in 1990. 
However, some of the individual countries experienced significant declines. 
Production declined 5 percent in the CSFR and 8 percent in Hungary. Hog 
inventories have declined steadily in these countries since 1990, as live hog prices 
generally failed to keep up with escalating feed prices. In 1992, pig stock further 
declined in most of the countries. 
The poultry industry in the region continued to be plagued by the high cost 
and/or scarcity of protein feed. In Hungary, poultry production costs increased 
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by more than the average rate of inflation, and especially more than input costs 
of protein feed and energy costs. As a result, poultry output fell in all of the 
Central Eastern European countries. Declines were greatest in Hungary, where 
producers are cutting back in response to the loss of the Soviet export market, 
and in Romania and Bulgaria, which suffered serious shortages of protein feed. 
In Bulgaria, poultry numbers fell by almost 50 percent in 1991, and just as was 
the case for pork, most of the decline was on the state-owned poultry complexes. 
Agricultural situation in the former USSR 
Economic conditions in all of the republics of former Sovjet Union (FSU) 
continue to deteriorate. Large budget deficits, rising inflation rates and erosion 
of living standards is leading to growing political opposition to reform programs. 
This trend is most obvious in Russia. But the same concerns continue to stymie 
reform in the Ukraine and hamper efforts in the Baltics, Central Asia and 
elsewhere. The decline in production in 1991 averaged 17 percent in all 15 
republics. In 1992 output declined by 15-25 percent in most republics. Inflation 
rates — already high in 1992 — are accelerating. They were around 1,000 
percent in 1992. 
The agricultural situation in the republics of the FSU was significantly 
affected by the events of late 1991. Following a relatively poor harvest in 1991, 
the disintegration of the Union of the Soviet Union set the stage for further 
decline in agriculture. The results of crop production in 1992 were also not very 
favourable, although there was an improvement over the poor 1991 results. Many 
of the usual problems — notably shortages in input supplies — continue to 
hamper producers. While small private farmers are growing in number, grain and 
oilseed crop production is likely to remain mostly in the socialized sector. The 
movement in some new states to put more of the productive agricultural lands 
into the hands of the small farmers will probably result in an increase in garden-
type crops such as fruits, vegetables and berries. 
The livestock sector in most republics of the FSU has suffered substantial 
damage in recent years, with continued stock reductions in most of the republics. 
Critical shortages of feed and veterinary supplies, combined with the ongoing 
problems of poor livestock genetics, stock management techniques, etc., have 
been extraordinarily injurious to the livestock industry. Once the decline in 
productivity and numbers has been stopped and stabilized, there will likely be a 
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considerable time lag until animal productivity and performance can be turned 
around and eventually improved. In 1992 the livestock sector showed few signs 
of recovery, though animal stocks and meat output continued to fall. Productivity 
in this sector will lag until a supporting infrastructure is developed — ranging 
from feed mills to outlets for veterinary needs — and an efficient market for 
farmers' and ranchers' output exists. 
Total grain production is one of the most frequently cited performance 
indicators within the agricultural sector in the FSU. It is also common practice 
to compare one year's achievement to that of the preceding year. In this fashion, 
1991 was pegged by many as a "bad year". Weather related problems were to 
blame for most of the decreases in production. However, difficulties beyond the 
farm gate also affected agricultural performance. Total net grain output in 1991 
in the 15 FSU republics slightly exceeded 160 million tons. As mentioned above, 
comparing 1991 to the previous year, the apparent 26 percent plunge in the 
harvest indicates a relatively poor showing. While 1991 should not be considered 
anything other than an unsatisfactory crop year, it is not entirely accurate to 
measure 1991 vis-a-vis 1990. Knowing that 1990 grain production was a near-
record high explains some of the 26 percent gap between 1990 and 1991 crops. 
Overall 1992 grain output in the 15 FSU republics was up about 15 percent from 
the 1991 level, but remained well below the exceptional output of 1990. Total 
grain production was about 175 million metric tons. As a result, grain imports 
are expected to be lower than in the previous season. 
Investment 
Investment in food and agriculture had already declined in the second half of 
eighties. The ongoing transition and the disintegration of the former agricultural 
structure have resulted in a further decrease in investment in agriculture. In most 
of the countries investments in agriculture were minimal or almost non-existant 
zero during 1991 and 1992. Furthermore, the use of chemicals, fertilizer and 
other inputs has also decreased to 50-30 percent of levels reached in the eighties. 
Agriculture has been using up its existing resources in most of the countries. 
Machinery is aging, replacements are postponed, and spare parts are difficult to 
obtain. Existing technology — with the exception of Poland — is to a large 
extent tuned to the needs of large-scale farming. 
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Most agroprocessing plants are old or were designed for the specific needs 
of the command economy. Most of these plants have a large portion of 
completely depreciated equipment and are not able to operate with profit under 
market conditions. The outdated, highly monopolized food processing industry 
is one of the major bottle-necks of the recovery of agriculture in the region. 
4.3 The main aspects of transformation in agriculture 
Investment needs in agriculture of the region are rather closely related to the 
results of the ongoing transition process in agriculture. The main direction of the 
transformation of the region's economies is shaped by the legacy of the command 
economy. In each country, the objective is to develop an economic agricultural 
structure based on a market economy, which leads to private initiatives and an 
economy based on private ownership. The most important components in 
developing a market-oriented and competitive food and agricultural structure are: 
— privatization and the creation of marketable landed property; 
— enterprise reform; 
— a governmental attitude that encourages and supports the emerging private 
ventures and fosters the transformation of the co-operative sector; 
— a real market that guarantees the conditions for fair competition through its 
overall rules, physical conditions, and institutions; and 
— a fundamental change in the role of government, including the reassessment 
of the agricultural sector within the macroeconomic framework. 
Apart from the similarity of the objectives, there are substantial differences 
among the countries regarding transition strategies and the speed of implementa-
tion. In the countries of Central Eastern Europe and the Baltics, where the 
political transition has bean completed to a large extent, comprehensive and 
major agricultural reforms have been implemented, while in the FSU agricultural 
reform moves rather slowly and with great difficulty. There are also substantial 
differences in the overall economic stability and openness of the economies 
concerned. Developed trade and political relations with the West and especially 
with the EEC provide a substantial contribution to the success of the reform 
process, while the collapse of trade relations within the FSU and the underdevel-
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oped trade relations with the developed world together with hyperinflation and 
the lack of a financial system make changes in the FSU more difficult. 
Investment priorities can be derived for the short- and medium-term tasks 
faced by most countries of the region during the process of transforming 
agriculture. The major short-term tasks in agriculture and the food sector faced 
by most of the countries can be listed as follows: 
— dismantling remaining elements of the command economy, such as the 
system of state orders for food procurement, trade restrictions, etc., together 
with creating a new macroeconomic environment for agriculture; 
— providing the minimum legal, institutional, and physical conditions of a 
market for agricultural products and inputs; 
— accelerating the structural transformation of agriculture, food production, 
distribution, and marketing; 
— ensuring the satisfactory supply of basic food stuffs to the domestic market 
in most countries except Central Europe. 
Over the medium-term the transition strategy recommended for the food and 
agriculture of the region should serve the following objectives: 
— expedite and possibly complete the transition to a market-based system for 
food production, processing, and marketing, including privatization; 
— improve the efficiency of production, processing, and distribution of food 
and agricultural products; 
— exploit comparative advantage in agriculture, improving the competitiveness 
of agricultural products in international markets. 
The completion of the major tasks of transition to a market based food and 
agricultural system requires, among other things: 
a. full scale land reform with the legal rights of full private ownership of land, 
and restructuring of state and collective farms based on the decision of 
members; 
b. explicit policies on a range of supporting services — including production 
imports, agricultural research and extension and market information — that 
is needed to support an agricultural production system based on private 
ownership; 
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c. more explicit land and water use policies that give appropriate attention to the 
needs of the food production sector and the need for environmentally sound 
management of the natural resource base; 
d. the privatization of most processing, wholesale and retail trade in food and 
related transport activities; 
e. creation of a strong and flexible agricultural credit system; 
f. liberal international trade policies to facilitate trade with FSU republics and 
other countries; 
g. radical adjustment of the government's activities and management structure 
from the ministerial level down to local, regional and municipal levels. 
Completion of the agricultural reform program — namely land reform, state and 
collective farm and enterprise restructuring, and privatization — is an important 
precondition for the improvement of the efficiency of primary production, 
processing, and distribution of food and agricultural products. Appropriate 
policies are needed to support investments in new technologies and methods of 
production. Changes are also required in the structure of production and the 
regional production patterns. The improvements in production techniques and 
methods should be reflected through improved crop and livestock yields at a 
constant level of input, or alternatively the same yields at a lower input level. 
The natural endowments for food and agriculture provide the potential for several 
countries in the region to produce more food and agricultural products than are 
required to meet domestic needs. These countries should try to exploit their 
potentials as soon as possible. However, competitive and profitable export of 
their agricultural products will require substantial improvements in product 
quality as well as in international marketing. 
4.4 Major areas of investment 
Considering the current situation and the major tasks of transition, the region's 
investment priorities can be listed as follows: 
a. development of the physical facilities for a working market for agricultural 
products and inputs for agriculture; 
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b. rehabilitation of production facilities to reach a minimum level of food 
security in most of the FSU countries; 
c. recapitalization of agriculture according to the emerging new farming 
structure; 
d. reconstruction and major modernization of support services (such as the seed 
industry and machinery maintenance); 
e. reconstruction and major modernization of agro-processing; 
f. introduction of environmentally friendly technologies. 
Development agricultural market structure 
The new structure presumes that free markets in the food economy can be 
developed and implemented. The total market system must supply markets for 
inputs, domestic food, and international agricultural and livestock products. The 
tasks required for creation of this system have organizational, institutional, legal, 
and regulatory aspects. 
It is important to create the minimum physical facilities for farmers' 
markets and a wholesaling network designed for private farming as soon as 
possible. Currently, the need to simply create a marketing structure for farm 
products represents a major hurdle, but at a later stage the new market structure 
should include improved physical facilities, such as auction halls, city markets, 
regional cooperative packing and grading facilities, and transportation equipment. 
Market information services for farmers should also be available, i.e., radio and 
television programs and farm newspapers. The more developed domestic 
agricultural markets will require a commodity exchange. (Commodity exchanges 
are already operating in many countries.) More efficient and co-ordinated 
international marketing for agriculture should be supported by commercial export 
marketing organizations. 
Rehabilitation of production and recapitalization of agriculture 
All the countries have experienced a decline both in production and demand for 
food. In several countries, especially in the FSU, food imports have to be 
increased to maintain even a modest level of supply. Investments, especially in 
machinery, are needed to stabilize production and save hard currency during the 
critical first period of transition. 
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The supply of basic inputs and machinery services is critical to the 
emerging private sector. Currently, neither the required distribution structure nor 
critical inputs exist in most of the countries concerned; tractors and other 
machinery suitable for small-scale farming are also not available in most parts of 
the region. Because development of a private commercial system is the best way 
of supplying inputs and machinery services, a network of farm supply shops 
should be created quickly. For the short-term in many areas, especially the FSU, 
Bulgaria, and Romania, the new co-operatives can be the major institutions of 
supply, if they are established soon. Over the long run, private firms, including 
foreign ones, are likely to be involved. Development of a nationwide commercial 
network of supply, however, will take several years; therefore, imported tractors 
and other farm machinery should be offered both to the service enterprises and 
to private cooperatives and farmers. Credit availability to cover inputs and 
services should also be organized. 
The new political and economic situation followed by land reform 
legislation created totally new conditions for the farming sector. The transition 
to a market-based economy raises the question of the future of collective and state 
farms, which are not suited for efficient operation under market conditions. One 
of the major issues is what kind of new farming structures that will emerge in the 
region. 
The land reform process has focused attention on the restructuring of 
collective and state farms, which are the main source of land in all countries of 
the region, except Poland. Structural and organizational reforms in the collective 
and state farm sector, however, began independently of land reform legislation 
almost a decade ago. These changes are taking several different forms: 
a. expansion of individual subsidiary farms within the existing structure of large-
scale collective and state farms, and their organization into "small co-opera-
tives" of several neighbouring families; 
b. creation of "lease co-operatives" as comparatively independent profit-oriented 
subdivisions of existing collective and state farms; 
c. conversion of collective and state farms into joint-stock societies; 
d. separation of individual peasant farms or co-operatives from the existing 
large-scale farming structure; and 
e. complete dismantling of large-scale farms followed by total privatization of 
their land and assets. 
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Although the reorganization began as a spontaneous process, later legislation 
adopted in 1990-1992 made the restructuring of large-scale farms compulsory in 
most cases. The legislation provided a general framework for the distribution of 
land and assets in large-scale farms, but left the responsibility for making the 
final choice of a new structure with the members. In principle, none of the 
specific forms of farming structure is imposed by legislation upon the members. 
Restructuring of the farm sector is an ongoing process and its final results 
will vary between countries. In Central and Eastern Europe, this process will 
radically reshape the farming structure, although the majority of members 
probably will not opt for fully independent private farming. In the FSU, the latest 
statistics indicate that a large proportion of collective and state farms are 
undergoing some form of reorganization and restructuring, but very few large-
scale farms have actually dissolved and been broken up into totally independent 
private farms. Most of them continue to exist as "federated" structures or 
"associations of producers". One of the factors keeping these individuals together 
is the developed social infrastructure created and maintained by the collective and 
state farms. Further economic reorganization of the agricultural sector in the 
former Soviet republics must find acceptable solutions to the problem of social 
assets, for instance, by entrusting them to the care of local municipal authorities, 
supported by sufficient budgets and taxes. 
No doubt as a result of the process of farm restructuring and land 
privatization a large proportion of farm equipment and buildings will become 
unsuitable for the new structure or will require substantial reconstruction. At this 
moment it is very difficult to estimate the magnitude of new investment 
requirementcreated by the land reform throughout of the region. The investment 
needed to establish independent family farms is estimated in several countries to 
be hundreds of million dollars. The restructuring will definitely require a longer 
period as well as related investment. However, in the near future the early fase 
of this process will create demand for a wide range of farming equipment and 
construction material. 
Reconstruction of food processing industry 
Food processing is the bottle-neck in the food sector. The relative backwardness 
of the processing of foods is an extremely serious handicap for the agricultural 
sector of the region. Not only can the level of processing be seen on regional 
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export products, but to a large extent it also determines their price and indeed, 
whether they can be sold at all. It cannot be over-emphasized that the demanding 
international markets can only be satisfied with food processing at a much more 
developed level than at present. The development of food processing in a way 
that is clearly linked to export strategy is an indispensable condition for 
competitiveness and the improvement of export efficiency. Naturally, more 
demanding processing is also becoming increasingly important for the region 
consumers too. 
Need for environmentally friendly technologies 
The increased assertion of environment protection requirements means, above all, 
that: 
— greater scope must be given to materials- and energy-sparing technologies; 
— protection of the soil and the safeguarding of its quality must become a 
fundamental criterion for agricultural production; 
— the emphasis must be placed on environmentally friendly procedures. The 
principle goal is the prevention of environmental pollution and the reduction 
of technological steps and harmful by-products damaging to the environment, 
but the spread of environmentally friendly packaging materials made from 
"natural" materials is also desirable; 
— the proportion of waste-free or recycling technologies should be increased; 
— technologies preserving the original property of the basic material, and foods 
made with these technologies must be given greater emphasis; 
— the reduction and elimination of the use of chemicals is becoming an 
increasingly important consideration. 
4.5 Future perspectives 
There are a host of other problems, but the basic message is by no means one of 
despair. Most of the countries concerned are not poor. Most can be self-
sustaining, credit-worthy and have market access. But we must recognize the 
complexity of the changes taking place; the social costs; the political strains; the 
investments needed in nation-building. The point is for us to be realistic about the 
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task ahead, the problems to be faced, and the time required. In particular, the 
following points should be emphasized: 
— Dedicated people are at work trying to change the system and make the new 
approaches work. But there is fear of the future. 
— This is not a matter of merely revealing a pool of latent entrepreneurial 
talents. Generations of experience have taught risk avoidance, suspicion and 
survival techniques. 
— The scale of the problem is unprecedented. 
— All previous discussions about sequencing have become academic. 
— Speed is essential, but also difficult to achieve. Efforts need to be focused on: 
* actions which will show quick results (market development, retail 
privatization); 
* actions which will offer opportunity to more people and involve them in 
the development process. 
No one today is in a position to project where Central-Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR and their agriculture will be at the end of the decade. What we can 
say with some certainty is that: 
— They will not all have evolved in the same way, nor at the same pace. 
— Not all transformations which have been started will be completed peacefully. 
— Progress will not be linear. There will be setbacks, some major. 
— Institutional weaknesses, social structures, attitudinal changes will slow down 
structural change and economic growth. 
In order not to be disappointed, it is best to be realistic at the outset. The early 
euphoria envisioned a quick transformation, followed by an equally quick supply 
response. But developments thus far, and the experience of both Eastern Europe 
and East Germany, suggest otherwise. Gradually, the perception is growing that 
the process will be slower than anticipated and that, consequently, the social and 
political strains on these very fragile systems will be greater. However, one also 
has to believe that the whole task is not impossible. The region has all the 
natural, economic and human resources necessary to become a fully integrated 
and prosperous part of the developed world with developed and productive 
agriculture in the foreseeable future. 
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Chapter 5 
The PHARE Programme and Agriculture: 
Context and Operation 
M. Franco' 
5.1 Introduction 
This paper is structured in two parts. Firstly, I will give an overview of what 
has been happening in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the last three 
years and draw some conclusions from this description. Secondly, I will 
address what the European Community (EC) is presently doing, concentrating 
on the PHARE programme, but putting PHARE in the more general context 
of other initiatives and activities. 
5.2 Accomplishments in Central and Eastern Europe 
In discussions about agriculture or other sectors of the economy Central and 
Eastern Europeans tend to be very pessimistic. One commonly hears that 
'things are too slow, that this landlaw cannot go through Parliament, that this 
privatization operation is not advancing very quickly enough'. While this is 
certainly true, we very often forget that the transformation process is only 
three years old. Three years during which the accomplishments have been 
impressive, not only in CEE but also in the former Soviet Union. The scale of 
reforms undertaken have probably never been attempted anywhere else in the 
world. And the results are not that negative. Of course, if one looks at the 
macro-economic level, the picture is different in each country. 
To begin with, you have CEE on the one hand and the former Soviet 
Union on the other, to which you can not apply the same conclusions. Within 
CEE, you also have different situations: the Visegrad countries (Poland, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary) are clearly more advanced than the 
Commission of the European Communities, Directorate General External Economic 
Relations, Operational Service PHARE 
80 M. Franco 
others (Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and the Baltics). Nevertheless, and 
particularly for CEE, the macro-economic indicators over the last year have 
been relatively positive. There are still decreases in GDP and high inflation 
rates, but both these indicators are improving. The hyper-inflation rates of a 
few years ago have disappeared, and in some cases one can see positive 
growth rates. 
Agriculture can be taken as an example of a sector in growth. While the 
production in 1992 was not particularly good, as in the case of Poland, we 
must not forget that CEE has suffered one of the most severe droughts that 
has ever hit the northern part of Europe. Moreover, in spite of this natural 
phenomenon, agricultural production has increased. This can partly be 
explained by a shift in the production pattern; in many countries, small farms 
are replacing very big farms. This change in the structure of farms has led to 
a shift in production from crops typically grown on large farms, such as sugar 
beet or wheat, to small farm products like vegetables or small animal bree-
ding. 
Trade is picking up, particularly in agricultural. The tremendous fall in 
the flow of goods within the COMECON has been replaced by an increase in 
trade with the EC, which is more or less in balance. There has been a slighter 
increase of outputs from the EC to CEE, which can be estimated at 20% over 
the last three years. The CEE countries have increased their exports to the EC 
by 15-17%. I will come back to this in the light of the agreements between the 
EC and these countries. 
Still, the region faces great difficulties. The unemployment problem has 
yet to be solved. In this respect, agriculture can play a determinant role by 
limiting the damage and thus helping to maintain unemployment at a decent 
level. Lack of capital is another problem. This is probably less severe in 
agriculture than in other sectors such as energy, industrial investment, and 
infrastructure, where the needs are great and no solutions have been found. 
While several problems remain, this negative trend will probably 
improve and if the right conditions are met, a certain increase in productivity 
and a stabilization of the situation can be expected. This macro-economic 
phenomenon is in harmony with the changes that have been accomplished in 
the legal and privatization areas. All these countries have established and 
implemented legal frameworks, though some have not completed them yet. 
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Privatization efforts vary according to the type of enterprise. Fast privatiza-
tions have occured for small businesses such as shops, cafés, restaurants, 
small ateliers, and in the service sector. These have been auctioned and new 
business initiatives have been created. Warsaw is a good example of a city 
where in just three years time, small businesses have appeared everywhere. -
The transformation of co-operative farms into individual farms, which con-
cerns 70 to 80 % of the land ownership, has occurred in almost all countries. 
In contrast, the privatization of large companies is proceding very slowly in 
some countries, and has not even begun in others. This is a much more 
difficult process as it requires state intervention. Something has to be done 
with those large companies that cannot be left vulnerable to market forces. To 
begin with, they have to be reorganized in some way. The same is true for the 
state farms. In most of the countries, state farms have not been privatized and 
are posing difficulties, especially with problems in the industrial activities 
connected to agriculture, both upstream and downstream. Those that have not 
been privatized do not create the adequate stimuli or signals to agriculture, be 
it in terms of the supply of inputs or in the purchase and the transformation of 
outputs. At this point I would like to stress that agricuture is by and large 
privatized (70 or 80%), but that it is now waiting for the right signals from 
the agro-industrial sector. 
Another problem the CEE is facing is the lack of financial mechanisms. 
No financing or banking sector exists that can transfer funds from savers to 
investors, or that can assist a farmer with the purchasing of equipment on a 
credit basis. Some banks are now appearing, whereas in the past there were 
only money windows where an individual would get instructions from the 
Ministry of Planning to supply money to another person without knowing if 
this operation was economical or whether risks were involved. This system 
has now disappeared, but the banking system on which people should rely still 
does not function well. Of course, this development has been stymied by a 
complicating factor: high interest rates make it very unattractive for people to 
borrow money. 
Privatization and macro-economic stabilization are two aspects that 
depend on each other: you cannot have macro-economic stabilization without 
an economy that functions on a private basis. If the old system continues to 
exist, the process of stabilization will be quickly undercut, because there will 
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again be a credit boom (for instance due to intercompany credit systems). On 
the other hand, privatization is almost impossible without stability, because no 
one will invest in a company if the political and macro-economic situation is 
unstable. 
To conclude, I would like to say that one can be optimistic about what 
has been accomplished and about the prospects for the future. Credit for these 
accomplishments, I have to stress, is solely due to the governments of the 
countries concerned. The international community (financial institutions, 
bilateral donors and the European Community) has contributed to the process, 
but it is thanks to the efforts of the people of these countries that it has been 
made possible. 
5.3 The relationship between the European Community and Central 
Eastern Europe 
To what extent has the European Community provided the necessary support 
for this transformation process to happen? I will describe first the political and 
the commercial efforts, then the financial and technical areas of co-operation. 
These are the four forms of assistance that have to be offered to these coun-
tries to make it possible for their, current efforts to really bear fruit. 
Political and commercial co-operation 
With respect to political and commercial co-operation, there has been some 
quick action from the European Community. In 1989 and early 1990 there 
were only 'general trade and economic co-operation agreements', between 
these countries and the EC. These agreements were quickly outdated and 
replaced by the Europe Agreements that have been made with Poland, Hunga-
ry, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria and Romania. These agreements 
are a first step in the long process of integrating these economies into the EC. 
In the agreements these countries made a unilateral declaration of intention to 
become members of the EC. At the Edinburgh Summit of December 1992 no 
timeable was agreed upon, for obvious political reasons, but it was stated that 
the goal of eventual membership in the European Union for countries of CEE 
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is a common objective of those countries and of the governments of the 
Community. 
With respect to the trade issue, the goal is to create a free trade area 
with a reciprocal but non-symmetrical reduction down of trade barriers. Some 
obvious problems exist where free trade does not apply, as in agriculture, 
textiles and steel. These problems need to be addressed as they still limit the 
possibilities for countries of Central Eastern Europe to export their best 
products. I'm not sure how close we can come to meeting the goal of a free 
trade area, considering the current crisis in European agriculture, and the 
unfavourable general economic conditions. But I am sure that progress will be 
made. This problem cannot be isolated and must be seen in the context of the 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, of European agriculture's place 
within the European economy and, of course, also in the context of the GATT 
negotiations. Nevertheless, the results are not so bad. As mentioned above, 
there has been a tremendous growth in trade. Between 1989 and 1992 exports 
from CEE countries to the EC rose 16% and exports from the Community to 
those countries rose about 20%. The Community has in fact taken over the 
place of the former COMECON countries, and the trade with the rest of the 
world, in particular the United States, has remained more or less at the same 
level. Whether it has been due to the Europe Agreements or some other cause, 
trade has certainly intensified and it is clear that a positive effect is being 
seen. 
Financial and technical co-operation 
The second facet in the relationship between the Community and Central 
Eastern Europe is the financial and technical co-operation. In this respect the 
EC has to help the countries of Central Eastern Europe face three types of 
problems: stabilization, transformation, and development. 
Stabilization is necessary to improve the macro-economic situation, for 
example, by keeping the monetary and credit system under control, keeping 
the budget deficit under control, stabilizing the currency. This is typically an 
IMF intervention field with some World Bank support. However, some 
bilateral donors have been giving or lending money. The Community supplied 
approximately 2.5 billion ECU of stabilization loans to countries of Central 
Eastern Europe, normally attached to IMF stand-by type of agreements. This 
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money was added to what the IMF has made available to these countries with 
the typical policy conditions and conditionally. Stabilization is not really the 
area where PHARE and TACIS (a program for the former Soviet Union) are 
active. We have contributed a little through balance of payments support 
programmes for specific sectors, but it was certainly not the main activity of 
PHARE. 
Transformation aims at transforming the mechanisms of a planned 
economy into those of a market economy, i.e., the way the economy is 
organized, the legislation that has been written, the institutions that exist. 
Transformation aims at transforming the institutions into something that can 
help private initiative exist and develop. This has been the area of activity, the 
explicitly stated aim of PHARE and TACIS. Over three years PHARE has 
committed 2.3 billion ECU in this area, TACIS a little less, as it is a more 
recent programme (800 million ECU). The total figures for this year, which 
have not yet been committed, but are already earmarked in the budget, come 
to 3.3 billion for PHARE and 1.3 billion for TACIS. I will come back to the 
structure of the programmes as related to agriculture at a later stage. 
Development, the third item that I mentioned, refers to new invest-
ments, to renovate the industrial capacities of these countries, to develop or 
make a more productive agriculture, to modernize road systems, etc. This is 
not really the main area of activity for PHARE and TACIS. This is the 
responsibility of international banks such as the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), the World Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment. They have to provide this type of financing, because this is a commerci-
al undertaking. This is also an area where commercial banks or private 
investors should be active. But they have not been very eager to get involved, 
because of the economic, the macro-economic and political instability that still 
exists. Nevertheless, investment in all the countries of Central Eastern Europe 
over the last three years is estimated to be 10 to 12 billion dollars, with 
Hungary as the leading recipient, with 30-40% of the total. In this activity of 
development, the European institutions have also been active. The European 
Investment Bank, which basically has a Community mandate, has received the 
authorization to finance or co-finance some of these investments in CEE under 
the Community budget guarantee of up to 1.7 billion Ecu. Half of this money 
has now been spent. 
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5.4 PHARE and the transformation of agriculture 
General 
For PHARE the percentage of the total amount spent on agriculture in CEE is 
around 12% or 300 million ECU. For TACIS this is also roughly between 10 
and 15% or approximately 120 million ECU over the last two years. 
PHARE, and to a lesser extent TACIS, are decentralized programmes. 
In other words, we do not sit in Brussels and decide exactly what will happen 
with the money. Rather we define a general framework in which the money 
should be spent, and make a distribution of funds between the various coun-
tries. Within this general outline, defined by the Council of Ministers, and 
taking into account the amount of money which is put at the disposal of the 
country, an indicative programme is formulated on the basis of the proposals 
of the recipient country. Each country defines its own priorities. It will request 
more for privatization and less for agriculture, or more for infrastructure and 
less for telecommunications. An indicative programme is prepared. In each of 
the sectors, and given the amount that has been allocated to that sector, there 
are discussions with the technical ministry. A programme is then defined on 
how the process of transformation can be supported with PHARE or TACIS 
financing. In a country like Poland, we work with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
with a particular fund that comes out of the national budget of PHARE, and 
with an orientation of how to help the process of transformation of the Polish 
agriculture. This is the main task, in fact, of the Polish government at the 
moment, to which we can contribute but not take the lead. 
On what items has this money been spent? The following three exam-
ples give a broad overview of the types of programmes that are funded. 
Supply programmes refer to the stabilization aspect, and are a kind of hidden 
balance of payments support. They include the supply of fertilizers, plant 
protection chemicals or other types of inputs. Technical assistance focuses on 
the transformation process. Financial support focuses on the development 
aspect mentioned before. 
Supply programmes 
Supply programmes were started in the early transition years, when there were 
still very severe stabilization problems. At that time it was often difficult to 
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find the money to import essential inputs and get them to emerging private 
farms. We have supported programmes in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, and 
are still doing so in Albania. However, we do not particularly like them, 
because we do not think they are the best use of the funds. We can accept that 
it is an important type of support at a certain stage of the transformation 
process, but it is something that should be stopped as quickly as possible, as it 
consolidates state involvement in the distribution of inputs. An emerging 
private sector should take over, import the inputs and distribute them. Alt-
hough it is not a preferred option, it is the only option for which the money is 
very efficiently spent. It is much more difficult to disburse funds for technical 
assistance programmes, because they have a much longer lifetime and it takes 
more time to get them into operation. These supply programmes have played 
an important role and are still playing a role in Albania, but other options 
should be assessed. 
Technical assistance 
We have looked very intensively from the beginning at technical assistance. 
Technical assistance is primarily policy formulation. We have together with 
the World Bank, and sometimes with other bilateral or multilateral donors, 
helped the countries define an agricultural strategy. This was done in Poland 
in the first year, we have a team at this moment in Romania, and we have 
begun the process in Bulgaria, where the programme is now the government's 
responsibility. In Albania, the programme is also in the planning stage. I will 
be going to Albania, with the World Bank, the Americans, the Italians and all 
other donors involved in this country, in order to meet with the government 
and run through the various items of agricultural policy, trying to help them to 
make a more precise commitment for the implementation of the indentified 
measures. 
A second item, essential for privatization, is private land. Land reform, 
or the implementation of land legislation, is one of the prime objectives of our 
programmes. It is important because without land reform, there is no land 
market, and without a land market there is no price for land and one cannot 
start talking about cost-efficient agriculture. In many of the countries land 
registration systems disappeared in the early fifties and it was necessary to 
start them in fact from scratch. We have been supplying technical assistance, 
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computer equipment, copying equipment etc. in most of the countries in order 
to make the land reform happen. There again, it is not up to us to write the 
law, it is up to the government to decide what it wants to do and up to the 
Parliament to approve the law. But we can help with our experience and with 
some equipment. 
The privatization of upstream and downstream activities has been a 
sector in which we have been very heavily involved by the means of sectoral 
studies and audits. As I mentioned before, this is an area where things are not 
moving very quickly; the governments and the ministries of agriculture are 
slow to act, for various reasons. In many countries it seems that they want to 
maintain some kind of control over these institutions. 
Rural financial networks, either co-operative banking or other types of 
institutions, constitute another area where the Commission has been very 
involved, particularly in Poland. We have been working with European co-
operative banks on these issues, we have been paying them to work with their 
colleagues in Central Eastern Europe, in order to set up a viable system of 
finance, because as I mentioned before, without finance there will never be 
rural development. Extension work, in the sense of improving the techniques 
of agriculture and making agriculture more productive, is another priority 
area. It cannot be accomplished until the other elements of privatization of the 
economy have been fulfilled. The farmer will react to the signals when he gets 
them, and then we can give him the additional technical assistance with which 
he can start working. Moreover, it is not just a government business, many 
more actors are involved in this extension service. This is the structure of an 
average technical assistance programme as we have it in most countries, with 
various degrees of importance attached to the various elements. 
Finance 
The last item that PHARE covers is finance. The first activity supported in 
this area is rural credit guarantee funds. Such a fund is in place in Hungary 
and is functioning rather well. We are trying to start one in Romania, drawing 
on the lessons from the Hungarian experience. However, its succes is in no 
way sured, because Romania's financial system is much less developed than 
Hungary's. This financial system is very important, because for enterprises 
that do not have collateral, or for banks that are not ready or used to working 
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with the rural sector, the lack of collateral is a very important impediment in 
the supply of credits through a loan guarantee fund. As soon as the fund starts 
functioning, it increases the speed by which agricultural credit is supplied. But 
there are other factors needed to make the system really effective. 
The last example of PHARE's activities that I like to present here is 
credit lines. Credit lines for investment in agriculture are an absolute disaster. 
We are not alone in dealing with this disaster, the World Bank and other 
institutions face the same problem: money is not flowing. These are the most 
frustrating programmes, because credit lines do not function. The interest rates 
are too high, the financial retailing mechanism is not there, and investment is 
not really picking up. It is very difficult to have functioning credit lines; 
therefore, we have to take a very careful look at this area to see how we can 
improve performance. Suggestions have been made for risk capital funds, 
which would make the money available, not as a credit but as a kind of risk 
capital, an investment next to the private sector's investment. They are not 
easy to manage, but they would certainly lower the price of capital that an 
investor has to pay, and therefore facilitate the investment process. But a lot 
of work still needs to be done in the rural sector to make this happen. 
Chapter 6 
Agriculture in the Market Economy 
M. Tracy1 
6.1 Introduction 
This will not be a formal paper. I intend rather to pick up some of the points 
that have been made by previous speakers of this seminar, and which seem to 
me important, and to add a few points of my own. 
We have had excellent papers dealing with issues of capital and finance 
for agriculture in both Eastern and Western Europe. I shall concentrate on 
Eastern Europe, though I shall also have something to say about the role of 
the West. For convenience, I shall use the abbreviation CEECs for Central 
and Eastern European countries. 
6.2 Pre-conditions for the establishment of a market economy 
On the first morning, we had an excellent contribution by Professor Ellman, 
who stressed the conditions necessary for transition from a "semi-monetised" 
to a "monetized" economy. He pointed out the various ways in which the 
CEECs formerly did not have a monetized economy: transactions were often 
based rather on "reciprocity of favours". So money did not determine the 
allocation of resources, and the price system was ineffective. 
Professor Ellman also made clear what has to happen if a monetized 
economy is to be created. Enterprises must pay for goods received; they must 
react to prices; seize profit opportunities; and if they are unprofitable, ultima-
tely it should be possible for them to be declared bankrupt, rather than to be 
propped up artificially. 
He also emphasized the need for clear ownership rights, clear rules for 
decision-making, and stable money. I should like to enlarge on this last point. 
Among the CEECs, some have achieved a reasonable degree of monetary 
stability. Czechoslovakia, during 1992, had low inflation, and maintained the 
1. Agricultural Policy Studies, 20 rue Emile François, 1474 La Hutte (Genappe), Belgium 
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value of the crown against hard currencies. One hopes that this will continue, 
though — since the division of the country on 1st January this year — the 
Slovak crown has already depreciated by some 15% against the Czech crown. 
Hungary too has achieved reasonable stability. Poland appears to have got 
inflation more or less under control. 
On the other hand, Russia — and the other Republics of the former 
USSR — have lost control of their money supply: prices are rocketing, and 
the external value of the rouble is falling daily. It must be obvious that in such 
circumstances the development of an effective credit system is virtually 
impossible. Maybe the real interest rate is low, or even negative, when set 
against inflation. Nevertheless, if the nominal interest rate is as high as 118% 
— as it was in Russia in November 1992, according to Ellman's table — 
there is not much point in trying to explain to a potential borrower that this is 
really a negative rate because inflation is even higher: it is a brave man who 
will borrow for investment in such circumstances, for he would be betting on 
a continuation of hyperinflation and taking an enormous risk. 
Such dilemmas illustrate the problem of sequencing in the transition to 
a market economy. So much has to be done, in a situation which is economi-
cally and politically confused and conflictual: it is not easy to see where to 
begin. With hindsight, it is obvious that we got it wrong in Russia — and I 
say "we" deliberately, for the West bears its share of responsibility. I was 
myself involved in missions in late 1991 which urged on the authorities (of 
what was then still the USSR) the importance of price liberalization. This 
seemed to have become inevitable: it was so widely anticipated that supplies of 
food and other goods were being held back in the expectation of price 
increases. But when prices were liberalized, in January 1992, supplies still did 
not increase significantly, and prices shot upwards. 
This demonstrates the necessity of creating structures of production and 
marketing appropriate to a market economy. In the paper presented this 
morning by our Hungarian colleagues Halmai and Balogh, from Gödöllö, 
reference was made to the "risks of market-oriented transformation without 
market institutions". That seems to me a very apt phrase, and now I should 
like to say something on the topic of "institutions". 
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6.3 Institutions relevant to finance for agriculture 
First, a word of warning. We must be very careful about giving advice based 
on Western experience to our colleagues in the CEECs. Institutions that have 
evolved in a given social and economic context cannot necessarily be transpo-
sed into a different context. At the most, we can say: here we have an 
institution which has worked quite well for us - maybe you will find it useful 
too. But it is for those responsible in the CEECs themselves to decide what 
can work in their circumstances. 
One example concerns credit co-operatives. Dr. Wijffels of the Rabo-
bank, in his excellent paper at the beginning of this seminar, referred to 
experience with rural credit co-operatives of the "Raiffeisen" type. (Rabobank, 
incidentally, stands for Raiffeisen-Boerenbank, just as in Belgium and Luxem-
bourg CERA stands for Crédit Agricole Raiffeisen.) On the face of it, a 
system of credit co-operatives which has played a vital role in the development 
of European agriculture since the mid-nineteenth century should be useful in 
promoting the necessary restructuring of agriculture in the CEECs today: 
certainly, this is one of the institutions which should be looked at carefully. 
But it was pointed out to me by one of our CEEC colleagues at this seminar 
that in their circumstances, people in rural areas have such distrust of farming 
as an income source that they will be reluctant to put any savings they may 
have into a rural credit co-operative: they are more likely to look for oppor-
tunities elsewhere. 
I therefore appreciated very much the contribution by our colleagues 
from the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Dijsselbloem and De Haan, 
who explained the usefulness in the Netherlands of the "Guarantee Fund", but 
then made very clear the conditions under which such an institution can 
operate successfully. A loan guarantee fund can usefully support existing 
credit institutions; but until such institutions are operating effectively, there is 
not much it can do. 
Another topic relates to the ownership of farmland. For family farms to 
obtain credit, collateral is obviously essential, and hence ownership rights 
must be clearly established - which is by no means yet the case in several of 
the CEECs. Establishing ownership rights, however, does not necessarily 
mean "owner-occupancy". The renting of land may have a role to play, and I 
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am glad that Van den Noort contributed a paper on tenancy. We have not 
discussed this subject, which is perhaps a pity: in some circumstances, tenancy 
can be a particularly effective way of dealing with the problem of farm 
finance. 
Here, however, the difficulty of transposing institutions is particularly 
evident. Tenancy has evolved in each country in an organic way, subject to 
socio-economic circumstances. We have only to look at two neighbouring 
countries, the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. In the UK, the land-
lord-tenant system worked well for several centuries, with clearly-established 
practices as regards the responsibilities for "landlord's capital" and "tenant's 
capital": this played a major role in the progressive modernization of British 
agriculture. In Ireland, on the other hand, tenancy was associated with 
irresponsible exploitation of the peasants by absentee English landlords: to this 
day, "tenancy" is practically a taboo subject. 
Objectively, tenancy has advantages, and though it is unlikely to 
become widespread in the CEECs, it may be useful for them to enact legisla-
tion providing a framework within which individual contracts can be made. 
The Western experience demonstrates the difficulty in achieving a balance 
between the interests of landowner and tenant. The country in which I live, 
Belgium, has a higher share of land under tenancy than any other EC country 
(68% of the farmland), so it is of interest to look at the situation there. 
Conflicts constantly arose in landowner-tenant relations, and the legislation 
was substantially revised in 1988 in an attempt to establish a better balance. (I 
have included an English summary of this legislation as an Annex to this 
paper.) This revised Belgian law is probably the most comprehensive and 
best-balanced legislation available (at least on paper — its implementation 
remains to be seen). It covers all the essential aspects: 
— the duration of leases - a major innovation in 1988 was the introduction 
of "career leases" (bails de carrière); 
— the conditions under which the lease can be terminated, especially by 
the landowner; 
— the levels of rent; 
— the rights of the tenant if the land is sold; 
— compensation for improvements made by the tenant. 
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However, we must guard against the assumption that the restructuring 
of agriculture in the CEECs should lead to a "family-farming" pattern such as 
we know it in the West. Such an assumption did appear in many reactions, in 
both the West and East, after the collapse of the Communist regimes, and may 
initially have influenced some of our aid programmes. I hope we have now 
got beyond that. The paper by our Hungarian colleagues from Debrecen 
(Karpati, Nabradi and Ujhelyi) is particularly useful because it sets out very 
clearly the different types of new-style voluntary co-operatives which can play 
a role, including "land-rent co-operatives", "holding co-operatives" and 
"service co-operatives". Maybe we should add "credit co-operatives": refer-
ring back to my previous point, the best chance of establishing rural credit 
co-operatives may be to build on existing institutions rather than try to create 
something totally new. 
There is of course a very considerable psychological obstacle. Every-
thing connected with the former forced collectivizsation is now so unpopular 
that even the word "co-operation" is treated with suspicion. We have to admit 
also that in the West, although service co-operatives and marketing co-opera-
tives have been very successful in several countries (foremost among them, 
the Netherlands and Denmark), there are relatively few cases of successful 
co-operation in production. 
The nearest we come to producer co-operatives is with the GAEC in 
France (groupements agricoles d'exploitation en commun). Maybe these have 
not had enough attention: I was surprised recently to discover that these 
occupy 11% of the agricultural area, and probably account for a higher 
percentage of dairy and beef production, since most of them are livestock 
farms. True, they are mostly small — in fact, in most cases, just two or three 
members of the same family, although the legal maximum is ten. The point is 
that here we have a legal formula which can, in appropriate circumstances, 
provide a basis for contracts between interested individuals. (Maybe also the 
expression "group farming" provides an acceptable alternative to "co-operati-
on"...). 
In France we also find the GFA (groupement foncier agricole), where-
by non-farming partners can provide land and share in the profits; and the 
EARL (entreprise agricole à responsabilité limitée), whereby non-farming 
partners provide not land but working capital. Again, these are potentially use-
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fui legal formulas: particularly, perhaps, in the circumstances in several 
CEECs where former landowners are recovering possession but do not want to 
farm themselves. 
6.4 Incentives and subsidies 
In this seminar, we have from time to time touched upon the controversial 
issues relating to price supports and other forms of subsidy for agriculture. 
Clearly, if necessary investments are to be made in agriculture in the CEECs, 
some degree of security is needed. At present, as we have been reminded by 
several speakers, agriculture is suffering from a severe cost-price squeeze, 
with input prices rising while the drop in consumer purchasing- power has 
meant a substantial fall in demand for foodstuffs. The temptation exists to 
introduce price-support measures; some CEECs moreover want to establish or 
re-establish self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. 
We cannot argue against price stabilization: we all know about the 
inherent instability of agricultural markets. But our Western experience does 
underline the need for caution: the tendency is to set a price floor above the 
point of equilibrium. Although there are currently food shortages in the 
CEECs, these can be quickly overcome as agriculture is restructured and 
technological progress re-asserts itself: and before long, they too could find 
themselves confronted by surpluses. 
There is something to be said, in these circumstances, for input subsi-
dies. In post-war recovery in Western Europe, subsidies for fertilizers, liming, 
land improvement and so on played an important role. Input subsidies are 
somewhat easier than price subsidies to remove when the need for them is 
gone. We have also touched in our discussions on interestrate subsidies. Csaba 
Csaki's speech reflected the World Bank's official disapproval of such 
measures, but perhaps we have to be more flexible. Dr Wijffels was prepared 
to admit the need for temporary interestrate subsidies. In principle, such 
subsidies are an element of distortion: but a case can be made for them in 
circumstances where the use of investment credit needs to be encouraged. All 
Western European countries subsidise farm investments through interest-rate 
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subsidies or through capital grants, and investment aids have been an impor-
tant element in structural policy under the CAP. 
6.5 The role of the West 
The old issue of "trade versus aid" has surfaced in our discussions. It is 
noticeable that very little reference has been made to financial aid from the 
West to the CEECs. Maybe that is just because the issue was not explicitly on 
our agenda, or maybe there is an implicit recognition that Western money, on 
its own, is not going to solve the problemsr There is, moreover, a risk that 
Western aid is linked to conditions which prove unrealistic: I have already 
touched upon the issue of price liberalization, and conditions as to limits on 
budget deficits, although correct in principle, may take insufficient account of 
prevailing economic and political circumstances. 
Technical assistance does have its role to play, and we shall be hearing 
from Marc Franco, from the EC Commission, about the activities of PHARE. 
There has been criticism of the extent of contracts to Western "experts" under 
such programmes. I have personal knowledge of some contracts given to 
Western agencies which could perfectly well have been carried out by people 
from the CEECs themselves, who would have gained useful experience as 
well as much-needed hard currency in the process. 
Opportunities for increased trade, quite obviously, are badly needed by 
the CEECs. The outcome of the multilateral Uruguay Round remains uncert-
ain. The bilateral "Europe Agreements" which came into force (as "interim" 
agreements) in 1992 between the EC and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland, and which will soon apply also to Bulgaria and Romania, do not give 
these countries free access to the EC market for their agricultural produce. 
Nevertheless, the concessions made to them, in the form of increasing quotas 
at reduced rates of levy and/or tariff, are perhaps more significant than has 
been generally recognized. Curiously, the Commission has never made 
available an analysis of these agreements: they are available in the Official 
Journal, but one has to be a customs expert to understand them (I have done 
my best to explain the main features, with the help of the responsible Com-
mission officials, in my recently-published book Food and Agriculture in a 
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Market Economy). I hope that we shall soon see some thorough evaluations 
from experts in the CEECs. 
6.6 Role of the academic community 
My final points relate to the role of the academic community. This has been a 
very good seminar, with excellent contributions from both East and West. 
Still, the number of participants from the CEECs has been limited: we have 
had strong Hungarian participation, largely I believe thanks to a TEMPUS 
programme, and one participant each from the Czech Republic and from 
Poland: but that is all, and I understand that colleagues who were expected 
from Bulgaria and Latvia did not turn up. This underlines a problem which in 
my view must be squarely faced by conference organizers. We are, to be 
frank, dealing with a situation where academic salaries in the CEECs, at 
current exchange rates, may be just a tenth of what we are used to in the West 
(even less in the case of Russia and the rest of the rouble zone), and where 
hard currency for travel is in very short supply. In every institute in the 
CEECs, there are many people who desperately want to get to conferences in 
the West, but funds are very limited and have to be strictly rationed. 
So we are in danger of having excellent conferences in which partici-
pants, mostly from the West, discuss intelligently the problems of Central and 
Eastern Europe, but which make little impact on the countries we are presum-
edly trying to help. 
If we want to have more participants from the East, the financial 
problem has to be overcome: we have to offer the greater part of travel costs 
as well as accommodation, and this should from the start be included in the 
pricing of the conference. Maybe conference fees should include a levy on 
Western participants, to be used for this purpose. Certainly, sponsors should 
be asked to take this problem into account. Official programmes such as 
PHARE and TEMPUS must of course be based on careful forward planning 
(PHARE is moving to multi-annual programming): still, it would be very 
helpful indeed if such programmes could be flexible enough to respond to this 
sort of need, at relatively short notice. I am sure this would be very cost-ef-
fective. 
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Annex 
Revised Belgian Tenancy Law 
Duration of the lease 
Leases cannot be for less than nine years. 
Termination by the landowner 
The landowner can terminate the lease at any time in order to use the land 
according to its end-purpose {destination finale) - e.g. in cases where it was 
designated as building-land already when the lease began. A minimum of three 
months notice must be given. 
At the end of each period, the landowner can terminate the lease if he 
can show a serious reason (motif sérieux) - in particular, if he intends to 
exploit the land himself, or cede it to a member of his family. Minimum 
notice is two years, maximum four years. 
During each period, but not during the first or second, the landowner 
can terminate the lease for the above reason. Minimum notice three years, 
maximum four. Landowner and tenant can also establish a lease for at least 27 
years. At the end of this period, the landowner can terminate the lease, again 
for the same reason. 
Landowner and tenant can also establish a "career" lease (bail de 
carrière). This must be for at least 27 years, and runs until the tenant is 65 
years old. At the end of the period in question, the land automatically reverts 
to the landowner. 
Termination by the tenant 
Whatever the duration of the lease, the tenant can always terminate it with a 
minimum notice of one year. 
Rents and other charges 
At the end of each three-year period, the landowner and tenant can ask the 
juge de paix to revise the rent, on the basis of profits during the previous 
three years. 
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"Profitability" refers to the return which a normal holding could be expected 
to give to the tenant, taking account of the quality of the land, the price of the 
products and the costs of production. 
The juge de paix takes his decision after receiving an opinion from a 
technical committee composed of three members nominated by the King on a 
proposal from the Ministry of Agriculture. A revision is granted only if a 
minimum 10% adjustment, upwards or downwards, is called for. 
Use of the rented property 
No restrictions can be placed on the tenant's use of the land nor on his sale of 
the produce. 
The lease may however require him to restitute the property in equival-
ent condition to that in which he received it (as regards fertility, cleanliness, 
etc.). 
At the end of the tenancy, a tenant who has borne the cost of building 
or other work is entitled to compensation on the basis of the value added to 
the property. If the work was carried out with the consent of the owner, this 
compensation cannot be less than the costs, subject to depreciation fixed at 4% 
per annum. 
Sub-letting 
The tenant cannot sub-let without consent of the landowner. 
Death of the tenant 
If the tenant dies during the lease, the lease may pass to his heirs or suc-
cessors {ayants-droit), unless otherwise stipulated in the lease and provided 
that the tenant leaves no widow or children. 
The heirs or successors can terminate the lease, subject to three 
months' notice; or can decide which of them should continue the lease. 
Indemnities due to a leaving tenant 
Besides the indemnity due in respect of buildings, etc., the outgoing tenant 
must receive from the landowner an indemnity in respect of stocks of straw 
and fertiliser, and of fertiliser left in the soil; and in respect of improvements 
to the land as regards its cleanliness. 
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Sale of the property and tenants ' rights 
The landowner can sell the land only after giving the tenant the opportunity to 
buy (droit de préemption). If the tenant does not exercise this right, the 
property cannot be sold to any other party at a lower price. 
In the case of sale by public auction, the tenant must be notified of the 
sale: he has the right to buy at the final price attained. 
Limits on rents 
Rent Committees (Commissions des fermages) are established by royal decree, 
consisting of three tenants, three landowners and one Ministry of Agriculture 
official, the latter presiding. 
Maximum authorised rents are based on cadastral value adjusted by a 
co-efficient. Co-efficients are fixed for each region by the Rent Committees, 
and are adjusted every three years, by reference to the average profitability of 
farms in the region in question. 
The rent established by this procedure may be increased by 18% in the case of 
18-year leases; or in the case of leases for 25 years or more, by 50% for the 
land and 25% for the buildings [other cases are also provided for]. 
Official Commentary 
The new [1988] law is a synthesis of the revisions to the basic law of 1969. 
Its importance is apparent when one considers that nearly two-thirds of the 
land in Belgium is under tenancy. Pressure on the land, moreover, is consider-
able. Further, if a modern tenant wants to maintain a viable holding, he must 
invest in new technology and expensive equipment: this takes up much capital, 
which is then not available to buy land. 
The new law establishes a balance between landowner and tenant: its 
main features are, on the one hand, greater security for the tenant, and on the 
other, increased returns for owners. 
Thus: owners consider that land is a form of capital which should give 
them an acceptable return. To this end, the law enables rents to be adjusted 
every three years. It also provides for higher rents in the case of leases for 18 
years or more. 
100 M. Tracy 
Long-term leases - 27 years at least - offer a guarantee of intentions and avoid 
abuses. The owner obtains greater possibilities for recovering his land at the 
end of such leases; in the case of a bail de carrière, he obtains full re-posses-
sion. 
Another major feature of the new law is to reinforce the tenant's "right 
of pre-emption" in case of sale of the property, without detriment to the value 
of the property. 
Loi sur le bail à ferme - Ministère de l'Agriculture, Service Information, Manhattan Center, 
Office Tower, 13e étage, 1210 Bruxelles. Summarised and translated by Michael Tracy. 
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